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EMPLOYING THE NINTH AMENDMENT TO
SUPPLEMENT SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS: RECOGNIZING THE HISTORY
OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE
EXISTENCE OF NONFUNDAMENTAL
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
Abstract: Asserted liberty rights not enumerated in the U.S. Constitu-
tion are generally considered under the substantive due process doc-
trine. Courts look only at narrowly defined interests and their history
and traditions, and recognize only fundamental rights. This approach,
however, fails to acknowledge the existence of nonfundamental rights
that deserve recognition and a level of protection from improper legis-
lation. As a supplement to its incomplete substantive clue process juris-
prudence, the Supreme Court should examine the Ninth Amendment's
history and traditions. Looking to this history and tradition will provide
better guideposts for what types of rights should be protected. Employ-
ing the Ninth Amendment_ in this way will also help alleviate three pri-
mary reasons for the Amendment's disuse: the Ninth Amendment was
not meant to apply against states, judges have no power to protect un-
enumerated rights, and the Ninth Amendment was only relevant under
the now-disfavored penumbras and emanations test.
INTRODUCTION
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, individual rights not listed
in the U.S. Constitution are affirmatively recognized only if they are
deemed fundamental) Courts use the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the Constitution to prevent federal and state governments
from depriving people of their liberty interests in unenumerated rights
without due process of law.2
 When people bring claims that their rights
have been violated by government regulation, courts narrowly define
the asserted liberty interest, look at the history and traditions of pro-
tecting that interest, and then determine if it is fundamental to the
I See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,719-20 (1997).
2 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-20. Due proc6s has
both substantive and procedural components. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719.
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concept of ordered liberty. 3
 If a court determines that the interest is
fundamental, the government must narrowly tailor its law to serve a
compelling interest. 4
This test, developed from the substantive due process doctrine,
does not adequately protect otherwise valid rights that courts do not
deem fundamental.5
 If a law infringes a right that is not considered
fundamental, the government merely must demonstrate some rational
basis for passing the law. 6
 This rational basis threshold is a low one—
otherwise valid rights can be ignored based on the government's ar-
guments for a law, regardless of the acceptability of its assumptions.?
This lack of consideration for nonfundamental rights also requires
courts to view asserted liberty interests as an all-or-nothing gambit-
unenumerated rights are either fundamental or they are not rights at
all.8 Abortion rights, sexual privacy rights, and the right to refuse medi-
cal treatment have all been examined under variations of this ap-
proach.9
Contrary to this all-or-nothing approach to rights, the framers of
the Constitution, including the Ninth Amendment's drafter, James
Madison, understood there to be a vast number of rights and different
levels of protections for them. 1° Madison drafted the Ninth Amendment
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-22.
4 Id. at 720-21.
5 See id. at 720-22.
See id. at 722.
7 See id.; Lofton V. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819-20
(11th Cir. 2004) (holding that even if the assumptions underlying the government's belief
in preventing homosexuals from adopting are wrong, the mere fact that they can be ar-
gued is sufficient to pass rational basis review).
8
 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-22.
9 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (affirming fundamental
tight to have an abortion); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279, 281
(1990) (acknowledging the right to refuse medical treatment); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (denying the existence of right to engage in homosexual sodomy),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating law that prohibited
homosexual sodomy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that there is a fun-
damental right to have an abortion, in light of the right of privacy). Although the majority
opinion in Cruzan did not hold that the right to refuse medical treatment is fundamental,
five Justices attempted to answer this question and considered the answer integral to the
decision. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 302, 304 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 341-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10 SeeJanies Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives ( June 8, 1789), reprinted in
JACK N. RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 176-79 (1998)
[hereinafter Madison's Bill of Rights Speech]; see also Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: Imple-
menting the Ninth Amendment, in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 8-9 (Randy E. Bar-
nett ed., 1993) (citing 1 ANNALS OF LANG. 759-60 ( Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds.,
1834) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick)) [hereinafter Statement of Rep. Sedgwick]; James Ire-
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to alleviate concerns that rights not listed in the Constitution or the Bill
of Rights would be left unprotected. 11 The Amendment's final wording
was important enough to extend significantly the debate between the
Virginia state convention and the U.S. Congress about whether to ratify
the draft Bill of Rights."
The Ninth Amendment was also at the heart of the U.S. Supreme
Court case that first recognized a right to privacy, even though that
right is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution." The Ninth
Amendment states that unenumerated rights should not be dispar-
aged or denied merely because they have not been enumerated in the
Constitution." And yet, today the Ninth Amendment still languishes
in jurisprudential obscurity and confusion. 15
This Note argues that courts should employ the Ninth Amendment
to affirm that some unenumerated rights test is required generally, and
to supplement the substantive due process doctrine by recognizing non-
fundamental unenumerated rights and providing additional decision-
dell, Speech in the North Carolina Ratification Convention (July 28, 1788), reprinted in
RAKOVE, supra, at 146 thereinafter !retiell's Speech in the North Carolina Convention]; infra
notes 108-128 and accompanying text (explaining the history of the Ninth Amendment and
the views of its drafter).
tt See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, sup-a note 10, at 178-79; see also RANDY E. BAR-
WIT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 235 (2004); CALVIN P. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS:
THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE. CONSTITUTION'S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 13 (1995).
12 See RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 113-14, 168, 202; Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Mean-
ing of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEx. L. REV. 331, 333, 371 (2004). Virginia withheld ratifica-
tion until 1791 after reassurances from the Ninth Amendment's drafter, Madison, that the
Amendment could be used to protect against broad interpretations of federal power. Lash,
supra, at 392-93 (citing James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank
(Feb. 2, 1791)).
'5 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965); id. at 487-93 (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. IX; see BARNETT, supra note 11, at 235; MASSEY, supra note 11,
at 71.
15 See infra notes 129-183 and accompanying text. Although the majority in Griswold
mentioned the Ninth Amendment and Justice Goldberg explored it in his concurring
opinion, Justice Black in dissent referred to the Ninth Amendment as a recent discovery.
Gristoo/d, 381 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting). Within and since Griswold, several Justices
have referred to certain individual rights as Ninth Amendment rights. See Troxel v. Gran-
ville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (right of parents to direct the up-
bringing of their children); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 721 (1974) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (voting rights); Gristookl, 381 U.S. at 531 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (right to persuade
elected representatives). Some lower courts have referred to the Ninth Amendment as a
more general protector of unentimeratecl rights. See Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 537
(6th Cir. 1991); Charles v. Brown, 495 F. Supp. 862, 863-64 (N.D. Ala. 1980). In general,
however, the Ninth Amendment is not a particularly common constitutional topic for
judges. See BARNETI, supra note 11, at 234-35.
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making guideposts.'s Part [ provides the current parameters for examin-
ing liberty interests under substantive due process and the presumption
of constitutionality for legislative action." Part II of this Note considers
the text of the Ninth Amendment, and reviews its ratification history's
Part III discusses the varied case law employing or avoiding the Ninth
Amendment's Part IV argues that the Ninth Amendment should be
employed as support for an unenumeratecl rights test generally and for
supplementing substantive due process specifically." Part IV also pro-
vides a summary and example of the proposed supplemented unenu-
merated rights test. 21
 Finally, Part V contends that the three primary rea-
sons the Ninth Amendment has been judicially avoided are answerable. 22
I. THE CURRENT UNENUMERATED RIGHTS TEST: SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS IN GLLICKSBERG
Substantive due process is a constitutional doctrine that protects
individuals' rights from government infringement. 23 The U.S. Supreme
Court's most recent enunciation of the test for determining unenu-
merated individual rights under substantive due process appeared in
1997 in Washington v. Glucksberg. 24
 If the asserted right is not fundamen-
tal, any infringing law maintains a strong presumption of constitution-
ality, as discussed in Section B. 25
16 See infra notes 198-270 and accompanying text.
17
 See infra notes 28-59 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 60-128 and accompanying text_
19 See infra notes 129-197 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 198-270 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 271-303 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 304-349 and accompanying text.
28
 See Kermit Roosevelt HI, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 993-94 (2006). This Note focuses on court recognition of liberty in-
terests under substantive due process. Though it is possible that the Ninth Amendment,
substantive due process, or a combination thereof could be used also to recognize unenu-
merated property rights, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance in this area. See
Robert J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 CEO. LJ. 555, 591, 609 (1997)
(arguing that, despite the Court's lack of attention to property for due process purposes,
certain interests in "property" merit substantive due process recognition and protection).
But see BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 584-85 (1996) (suggesting that funda-
mental property interests exist in holding that a two-million-dollar punitive damage award
was grossly excessive in relation to legitimate state interests).
24 521 U.S. 702, 720-22 (1997).
75 See infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
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A. Substantive Due Process in Washington v. Glucksberg
In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court thoroughly analyzed substantive
due process and stated the current test for recognizing rights not listed
in the Constitution. 26 The Court held that the plaintiff-patients in the
case had no right to physician-assisted suicide, nor did the plaintiff-
physicians have a right to assist them."
The Court's unenumerated rights test is essentially a fundamental
rights test." First, a court carefully and narrowly defines the asserted
liberty interest. 29 Then, the court determines whether this defined right
is fundamental based on the tradition and history of protections for
that interest, and whether it is necessary to the concept of ordered lib-
erty." If the asserted right is determined to be fundamental, the court
requires the infringing legislation to be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest." If the asserted right is not deter-
mined to be fundamental, the legislature must simply show some ra-
tional basis for enacting the law." This method generally does not rec-
ognize or affirmatively protect nonfundamental rights."
The Court in Glucksberg did, however, list unenumerated funda-
mental rights that have been protected by courts through due process
2° See 521 U.S. at 720-22; Peter]. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due
Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 CoLunt. L. REV. 833, 836-39 (2003).
27 See Glucksherg, 521 U.S. at 723,735. The plaintiffs in this case asserted that they had a
liberty interest that was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to
choose how to die and to control one's final days. Id. at 722. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit had found for the plaintiffs after defining the interest as a general right
to die. See id. at 709. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, defined the asserted interest as a
right to commit suicide and a right to have assistance in doing so. Id. at 723.
28 See id. at 719-22. For this test, the court determines whether the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that no person shall be deprived of liberty by
state governments without due process of law, protects a certain right. Id. at 719-20; see
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court in Glucksberg first acknowledged that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees more than just fair proce-
dural process. 521 U.S. at 719-20; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process
Clause also protects liberty beyond physical restraint, providing heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-20.
29 Glu cksberg,, 521 U.S. at 721.
3° Id. at 720-21.
31 See Rubin, supra note 26, at 842.
32 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-22.
33 See id. at 719-22; Rubin, supra note 26, at 844. Two Supreme Court cases have rec-
ognized individual liberty interests without describing them as fundamental, though both
were heavily divided opinions as to the nature of these rights. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558,561,577-78 (2003) (sexual act privacy); Cruean v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261,263-64,279,281 (1990) (refusal of medical treatment).
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analysis. 34
 These include the right to marry,35
 to direct the education
and upbringing of one's children,36
 to have children," to marital pri-
vacy,38
 to use contraception,39
 to bodily integrity,49
 and to have an abor-
tion.41
 The Court also has strongly suggested that a right to refuse un-
wanted life-saving medical treatment exists. 42
Nevertheless, the Court tempered its unenumerated fundamen-
tal rights analysis by noting its reluctance to expand the concept of
substantive due process. 43
 According to the Court, this reluctance is
due to the scarce and open-ended guideposts for responsible decision
making in this area." Although the outlines of the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment have never been fully clarified, and
may not be capable of such clarification, the Court stated that the sub-
stantive due process doctrine at least has been carefully refined by the
listed concrete examples. 45
 Thus, the Court can now avoid balancing
competing interests in every case. 46
 Furthermore, responsible deci-
sion making is important in this area because the Court faces a diffi-
cult question: should unelected federal judges determine policy and
make value judgments rather than elected representatives? 47
B. Limiting Rights: The Presumption of Constitutionality
In 1938 in United States v. Carotene Products Co., the Supreme Court,
in its famous "Footnote Four," wrote that state legislation has the pre-
54 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720; Rubin, supra note 26, at 843-44.
55 See Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99 (1987); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Rubin, supra note 26, at 843-44.
" See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer N. ,. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923).
57 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 535, 541 (1942); see also
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (describing Skinner as a case implicating the fundamental right
to have children).
" See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481, 484 (1965).
" See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
40 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
41
 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857-58 (1992).
42 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
43 Glueksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
44
 Id. at 720-21.
45
 Id. at 722.
48 Id.
47 See Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between Judicial
Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 V. L. REv. 1753, 1754-55 (2004); Michael Perry, Pro.
feeling Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 635,
637 (2003). But see Roosevelt, supra note 23, at 994 (arguing that the cost of errors in this
area is lower for courts than for legislatures because of the availability of judicial review).
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sumption of constitutionality, unless it violates a direct prohibition in
the Bill of Rights." Later substantive due process decisions expanded
this presumption to cover unenumerated but fundamental rights."
State legislation is thus presumed to be constitutional unless it violates
direct prohibitions in the first ten amendments, prohibitions elsewhere
in the Constitution, or judicially determined fundamental rights. 50
State governments' long history of broad police powers generally
supports this presumption of constitutionality." There has been, how-
ever, some question as to how limitless these police powers should be. 52
As far back as the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some
scholars argued for judicial limits to the state police power as it affected
personal liberty interests." Also, state courts have invalidated legislation
for going beyond the scope of the police power."
Then, in 2003 in Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court in-
validated a state law that prohibited homosexual sodomy, without ap-
plying an equal protection claim or determining that the law violated
a fundamental right. 55 Rather, the Court held that the Texas legisla-
ture had no legitimate purpose in invading the liberty interests of the
individual plaintiffs under substantive due process. 56 It appears that
the majority invalidated the law as having no rational basis, but this
was not explicitly stated by the Court. 57 The Court did not specifically
4s 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938); BARNErr, supra note 11, at 229-30.
49 BARNF.TF, supra note 11, at 233-34; see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; see also Carotene
Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4.
5° BARNETT, supra note 11, at 233-34; see U.S. CONST. amends. 1—VIII; Griswold, 381
U.S. at 486; Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4.
51 See RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 119. At the founding of the Constitution, states were gov-
ernments of broad legislative powers while the federal government was limited to enumer-
ated powers. See James Wilson, Statehouse Speech (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in RAKOVE, supra
note 10, at 121-22 [hereinafter Wilson Statehouse Speech).
52 See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L REV. 429,
430, 434 (2004).
53 See id. at 475. See generally ERNST ERF.UND, THE. POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMI-
TATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UN ITED STATES (1886).
61 See, e.g., Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 25 (Ga. 1998) (invalidating antisodomy law
for going beyond the proper scope of the police power); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2t1
936, 943 (N.Y. 1980) (same); Commonwealth v. Bonaclio, 415 A.2d 47, 49-50 (Pa. 1980)
(same).
55 See 539 U.S. at 564-79. Justice O'Connor did use an equal protection theory in her
concurring opinion, stating that because the antisodomy law applied only to homosexuals,
it violated equal protection. Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56 Id. at 577-78 (majority opinion).	 •
57 See id.; John G. Culhane, Writing On, Around, and Through Lawrence v. Texas, 38
CREIGHTON L. RF:v. 493, 497, 503 (2005); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications
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define any right at issue, fundamental or otherwise, but rather a gen-
eral liberty interest. 58
 Additionally, the Court did not provide guide-
posts for future determinations. 59
II. THE TEXT AND RATIFICATION OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
In Ma-Hwy v. Madison in 1803, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
every clause in the Constitution was intended to have some effect.° A
construction that would deny a clause any effect would be improper
unless the text itself required it. 61
 Yet, Supreme Court majorities have
avoided construing the Ninth Amendment and have left it with essen-
tially no binding meaning despite its plain language. 62 To understand
why, it is necessary to examine the text and ratification history of the
Ninth Amendment.°
A. The Text of the Ninth Amendment
The Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified in
1791 and states: `The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple."64
 An "enumeration" referred to a listing of specific items, of which
there are two relevant to this Note.65 First, the legitimate powers of the
federal government are all enumerated in the Constitution. 66 Second,
for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. Rim 1233, 1281-83 (2004);
Nan 13. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. RE v. 1103, 1113 (2004).
59 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564, 578.
59 See id. at 563-79; see also Gregory A. Kalscheur, SJ., Moral Limits on Morals Legislation:
Lessons for U.S. Lan, from the Declaration on Human Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. I,
3 (2006) (noting that Lawrence failed to provide guideposts for determining valid murals-
based justifications for slate laws).
60 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
61 Id.
62 See Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Modalities of the Ninth Amendment: Ways of Thinking About
Unenumerated Rights Inspired by Philip Bobbin's Constitutional Fate, 75 Miss. L.J. 495, 495-96
(2006); infra notes 129-183 and accompanying text.
65 See infra notes 64-128 and accompanying text.
64 U.S. CONST. amend. IX; see Lash, supra note 12, at 341.
65 Seel DR. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 352 (4th ed.
1773); infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. Dr. Johnson's influential eighteenth-
century dictionary describes "enumeration" as "the act of numbering." 1 JOHNSON, supra,
at 352. For the history and importance of Dr. Johnson's dictionary, see generally HENRY
HUTCHINGS, DEFINING THE. WORLD: THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF DR. JOHNSON'S DIC-
TIONARY (2005).
" See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cls. 1-18; RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 1 11.
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there are individual rights enumerated throughout the Constitution. 67
The clause "of certain rights" in the Ninth Amendment references the
latter of these enumerations. 68
The phrase "shall not he construed" was a declaration against a
particular type of interpretation or explanation.69 To "deny" a right
meant to disregard it or fail to accept that it exists. 70 To "disparage" an
unenumerated right meant to injure it or place it into an inferior con-
dition, even while recognizing its existence, in part because it was not
one of the rights listed in the Constitution. 71 Rights "retained" are those
unenumerated rights that the people did not dismiss, and still held,
after the Constitution was drafted. 72 At the time of the drafting of the
Constitution, "by the people" seems to have referred to the citizens of
the respective states.78
67 See U.S. CoNs-r. art. I, § 9, cls. 1-8; id. amends. I-VIII; RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 113-
14; David N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Professor McAf-
fee, 16 S. U. L.J. 313, 314 (1992).
68 See BENNETT B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 12 (1955). A WM
mon conception among framers of the Constitution was that individual rights and limits on
government powers were interwoven. Id. Protecting rights would, in theory, limit power and
limiting powers would protect rights. See id. These rights are contained predominantly in the
Bill of Rights, but are also spelled out elsewhere in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art_ 1,
§ 9, cls. 1-8; id. amends. PATTE,RSON, supra, at 12. The drafter of the Ninth Amend-
mentjarnes Madison, wanted to insert this Amendment into the middle of the Constitution,
after Article I, § 9, to make clear that rights were enumerated throughout the Constitution.
PATTERSON, supra, at 12; see EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BiLi. OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 44 (1957). It is also relevant that the framers were not generally concerned with pro-
tecting the people from their state.governments. See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727,
738-39 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). Yet, the framers' general conception of the reciproc-
ity of rights and powers did apply to both federal and state governments. See Randy E. Bar-
nett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1, 15 (2006). There was a
greater need for hills of rights in state governments because of their broader powers, as com-
pared to the federal government. See Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 90 CotuM. L. REV. 1215, 1252-54 (1990). Madison did make some proposals to
protect rights specifically against state governments, but they were not ratified. See DMA-
BAULD, supra, at 8, 41, 46-47.
66 See 1 JOHNSON, supra note 65, at 222.
7° See id. at 278.
71 See id. at 303.
n See BARNErr, supra note 11, at 54-55; 2 jonNsoN, supra note 65, at 259. Many fram-
ers of the Constitution subscribed to the idea that rights are inherent in the people and
that only certain rights are given up to a government upon its creation. See BARNETT, supra
note 11, at 55; Laurence Claus, Protecting Rights from Rights: Enumeration, Disparagement, and
the Ninth Amendment, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 593 (2004).
73 See United States v. Verdugo•Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (stating that "peo-
ple" in the Ninth Amendment and other amendments refers to a group of persons who
are part of a national community or who have Otherwise developed sufficient connection
with that country); Claus, supra note 72, at 593-94.
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This language meant essentially the same in 1791 as it means to-
day. 74
 The text of the Ninth Amendment states that the listing of cer-
tain rights throughout the Constitution should not be interpreted to
reject that other rights exist or to diminish the importance of unlisted
rights that the people did not give away, simply because certain rights
were enumerated. 75
 The text does not limit this construction to the
federal government; in fact, it does not mention the federal govern-
ment at al1. 76
B. Ratification of the Ninth Amendment
James Madison and the drafters of the Constitution encountered
an important enumeration problem in 1787, when political pressure
led them to add a list of particular individual rights to be protected by
the Constitution." A Constitutional Convention, consisting of repre-
sentatives of twelve of the thirteen states, had come together in Phila-
delphia to modify the Articles of Confederation. 78 Despite the Conven-
tion's intent and the understanding of the nation that they would merely
modify the Articles, the delegates created a new Constitution. 79
The Constitution established a federal government of enumerated
and limited powers, meaning that it could only act if it was authorized
to do so by provisions of the Constitution.8° State governments, how-
ever, had more general police powers, meaning that their legislatures
could pass laws within the proper scope of the police power unless they
were denied the power by the people, acting through their respective
74 See lliarnett, supra note 68, at 5.
75 See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text; see also PA-rrEasoN, supra note 68, at
19 (stating that although certain rights are enumerated, the reservation should not be
taken to deny or disparage any unenumerateci right not so apparently protected).
76
 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
n See RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 108, 119; infra notes 78-128 and accompanying text.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 106-07
(Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833); see Nat'l
Constitution Gtr., Delegates to the Constitutional Convention, http://www.constitutioncenter.
org/explore/FoundingFathers/inclex.shmal
 (last visited Man 2, 2007) (stating that Rhode
Island did not send a delegation to the Constitutional Convention). The Articles of Confed-
eration constituted the first attempt of the states to establish a federal government structure
for the newly formed United States of America. ROBERT J. MORGAN, JAMES MADISON ON THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE BH.I. of RIGHTS 12-13 (1988). The attempt failed, in part, because it
did not provide the federal government with sufficient governing powers. MASSEY, supra note
11, at 55; MotcoAN, supra, at 12-13.
79 RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 109; STORY, supra note 78, at 106-07.
RAtcovic, supra note 10, at 119; see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the
power to lay and collect taxes).
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state constitutions.81 Inherent in both the state and federal conceptions
of government was the belief that people possessed their full natural
rights before the formation of governments. 82 The people handed over
only certain rights and privileges upon the formation of government—
enumerated powers to the federal government and broad, but not lim-
itless, police powers to the state governments. 83 The people retained
the power to change this structure as well."
1. Distrust: Antifederalists' Call for a Bill of Rights
There were differing views on how well this constitutional struc-
ture of limited federal powers would achieve its goals.85 The delegates
at the Constitutional Convention, for the most part, believed that limit-
ing the federal government's powers would adequately protect the
rights of the people. 86 Nevertheless, there was opposition to the pro-
posed draft from people known as Antifederalists." Antifederalists were
primarily concerned that the federal government's power could be ex-
tended beyond its supposed constitutional limits," Expansive readings
of the "necessary and proper" power and the taxing power particularly
concerned them."
Antifederalists argued that the answer to the potential dilemma of
overreaching federal power was the addition of a bill of rights to the
Constitution." Despite Antifederalist weakness at the Convention, con-
81 RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 119. The broad state police powers are not without their
limits. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 25 (Ga. 1998) (invalidating antisodomy law as
beyond the proper scope of the police power); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936,943 (N.Y.
1980) (same); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47,49-50 (Pa. 1980) (same).
" See BARNET, supra note 11, at 55; PATTERSON, supra DOM 68, at 19-20.
88 See PATTERSON, supra note 68, at 19-20.
84 See AKHO, REED AMAR, AMF,RICA'S CONSTITUTION 327 (2005).
85 See infra notes 86-107 and accompanying text.
86 See STORY, supra note 78, at 693-94; Lash, supra note 12, at 348.
87 RAKOVE, Supra note 10, at 116-17.
88 Id. at 125; STORY, supra note 78, at 110-12.
" See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 1,18; RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 125. The Antifederal-
ists asked why, under this structure, the federal government could not reintroduce the
hated Stamp Act of 1765 which taxed newspapers and thereby restricted the free flow of
information and the people's right to freedom of press. RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 125.
Because freedom of the press was particularly at risk to government interference in the
recent past, it was apt for specific protection in a bill of rights. Id.
91' See RAKOVE, Supra note 10, at 125-26; STORY, supra note 78, at 693-96. The state
delegations at the Convention, which were mostly comprised of Federalists, unanimously
struck down a proposal of two delegates to appoint a committee to prepare a bill of rights
for the Constitution. See RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 113-14 (identifying the two delegates as
George Mason of Virginia and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts).
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cern over the potential expansiveness of the now-strengthened federal
government spread to state ratifying conventions.91 Many state conven-
tion delegates contended that a bill of rights was necessary for setting
up guideposts that showed when the federal government had over-
stepped its boundaries.92 The addition of a bill of rights became a rally-
ing cry for Antifederalists opposing the Constitution."
2. Federalists' Fears of a Bill of Rights
Supporters of the Constitution, the Federalists, argued that a bill
of rights was not necessary because rights were adequately protected by
the enumerated federal powers scheme." Properly limiting powers
would in turn adequately protect rights." The Federalists contended
that the new federal government would be quite different in structure
from state governments." The people invested state governments with
all the rights and powers that the people did not reserve, and therefore
silence on an issue favored the legitimacy of the state's legislative ac-
tion.97 The federal government could not legislate as states did because
its power was collected only from positive grants and not by any form of
broad implication, such as the states' police power. 98
Some Federalists argued that inserting a bill of rights might actu-
ally be dangerous. 99 The federal government, so the argument went,
potentially could state that the people had protected only those par-
ticular rights that were enumerated.'" At the same time, complete
enumeration was not possible—the drafters could not resort to listing
every legitimate right, including such minutia as the right to wear a hat
or wake up when one pleased.m Similarly, some Federalists argued that
91 See MORGAN, supra note 78, at 132-33; PATTERSON, supra note 68, at 8-9.
92 RAKOVE, supra note 10, at I25-26; see STORY, supra note 78, at 696; The Federal
Farmer, Letter XVI ( Jan. 20, 1788), reprinted in RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 133-35 [herein-
after Federal Farmer, Letter XVI].
McAffee, supra note 68, at 1227-28.
" See STORY, supra note 78, at 693-94; Lash, supra note 12, at 348.
95 See STORY, supra note 78, at 693-94; Lash, supra note 12, at 348.
96 See Wilson Statehouse Speech, supra note 51, at 121-22.
97 Id. Therefore, for state constitutions, bills of rights were more effective, and neces-
sary, protectors of rights. See McAffee, supra note 68, at 1253-54.
913 See MASSEY, supra note 11, at 56; Wilson Statehouse Speech, supra note 51, at 121-
22.
99 MASSEY, supra note 11, at 63; see Iredell's Speech in the North Carolina Convention,
supra note 10, at 145-46.
100 See MASSEY, supra note 11, at 62.
101 Statement of Rep. Sedgwick, supra note 10, at 8-9; see Iredell's Speech in the North
Carolina Convention, supra note 10, at 145-46.
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the federal government could be given powers by implication through
the addition of a bill of rights." If exceptions were necessary to limit
federal power to protect certain rights, then this implied that the gov-
ernment had some power to infringe those rights in the first place."
The Antifederalists did not necessarily disagree with these asser-
tions." Any problems that a bill of rights would create, though, were
merely similar problems that Antifederalists felt were likely to arise any-
way." One Antifederalist author hypothesized that the addition of a
bill of rights would, however, help the people determine and appreci-
ate when the government had overstepped its proscribed limits." At
least with affirmative protections, the people could know when they had
certain rights that the government should not violate. 107
3. The Ninth Amendment as the Answer to the Enumeration
Problem
The Ninth Amendment was not thrust upon the states, but rather
was rooted in their demands submitted to the Constitutional Conven-
tion." Generally, the states' recommendations about a bill of rights in-
cluded precursors to the Ninth Amendment that asserted that the enu-
meration of certain rights should not be read to deny or disparage other
rights, nor to constructively expand federal power." Various state con-
102 See Wilson Statehouse Speech, supra note 51, at 122.
103 See id.; see also McAffee, supra note 68, at 1307. For example, the Federalists con-
tended that the federal government had no power to regulate the press. See TUIF. FEDERAL-
1ST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). If, however, an amendment were added to the Constitu-
tion stating that the federal government shall not abridge the freedom of the press, this
would imply that the federal government had been given some power over the press in the
first place. See id. Antifederalists responded that such implications had already been written
into the Constitution. Mayer, supra note 67, at 314. The Constitution already stated that no
religions test for public office could be required, and, the Antifederalists responded, this
limit implied that the federal government had some power over religion. Id. Thus, a free-
dom of religion clause was necessary, not redundant. Id.
104 See Claus, supra note 72, at (104-05.
105 See id. Antifederalists contended that the propensity of all officeholders to seek
power needed to be restricted in every way. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE InEorooicAl. ORI-
GINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 56-58 (enlarged ed. 1992).
106 See Federal Farmer, Letter XVI, supra note 92, at 134-35.
1(0 See id.
105 See Jackson, supra note 62, at 502-03; Lash, supra note 12, at 350. Madison later
wrote to President Washington that the Virginia proposals, at least, played a role in his
draft of the gill of Rights that he proposed to Congress. See Lash, supra note 12, at 358
n,122 (citing Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Nov. 20, 1789)).
109 See Lash, supra note 12, at 355-58 & n.122. These proposals appear to be responses
to Federalists' arguments that a bill of rights would not be able to cover all possible rights.
See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
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stitutions already had provisions somewhat similar to the Ninth Amend-
ment, although they were applicable only within their state government
structures. 11° The Ninth Amendment was, thus, not a total invention by
the state ratifying conventions or by Convention delegate and Ninth
Amendment drafter James Madison." In light of this mounting politi-
cal pressure, Madison, a Federalist, eventually acquiesced and accepted
the need for a federal bill of rights. 112
The addition of a bill of rights had become a dead issue in the
House of Representatives, and so Madison could only get a select com-
mittee to listen to his proposals. 113 He explained to this committee that
a bill of rights was important because, even if the federal government
kept to its enumerated powers, its discretion as to the means of execut-
ing those powers could lead to limited abuses.'" A bill of rights would
act as a more secure safeguard against legislative power subject to abuse
than the draft Constitution. 115
Madison then tried to counter the enumeration concern that a spe-
cific list of rights could potentially exclude all others not listed. 115 His
LID See John Choon You, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967, 1009
(1993).
111 Yoo, supra note 110, at 1008-10 & nn.168-69 (describing the states that had similar
provisions before and after ratification of the Ninth Amendment, and contending that this
shows the states' understanding that such a provision directly protects rights and is not
merely a rule of construction).
112 See DUMBAULD, supra note 68, at 38; MORGAN, supra note 78, at 131. While Madison
was still considering the issue, Thomas Jefferson attempted to persuade him to accept
some form of a bill of rights. See RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 164; Letter from Thornasieller-
son to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1788), reprinted in RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 165-66 there-
inafter Letter from Jefferson to Madison]. Even if Madison were correct in his objections
to a bill of rights, Jefferson reassured, protecting some rights more fully and others weakly
was still better than not protecting them at all. See RAtcovE, supra note 10, at 164; Letter
from Jefferson to Madison, supra, at 165-66.
112 See PATEERSON, supra note 68, at 11. Madison's speech to the House became the
first public record and, thus, the first official discussion of the issue of a bill of rights. See
RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 168-69.
114 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-78; see also RA KOVE, supra
note 10, at 125. These limited abuses, Madison said, were similar to the indefinite abuses
that arose from state legislatures of general powers. See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech,
supra note 10, at 180; see also STORY, supra note 78, at 696.
112 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 171; see also MORGAN, supra
note 78, at 138-39; STORY, supra note 78, at 114.
116 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-79. In his most famous
statement on the Ninth Amendment, Madison said:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particu-
lar exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which
were not placed in that enumeration, and it might Ulm by implication, that
those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into
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answer to the Federalists was his early draft of the Ninth Amendment,
which attempted to retain the drafters' initial constitutional objectives of
limiting federal powers so as to protect tights, despite the explicit pro-
tection of certain rights added to the Constitution in the Bill of Rights." 7
This early draft stated that exceptions in the Bill of Rights, or elsewhere,
made in favor of certain rights should not be construed to diminish
rights retained by the people or to enlarge the federal powers." 8 These
exceptions, Madison said, should only be construed as limitations on
the federal powers or • as calls for caution against expansive federal
power."8 Madison noted that the "necessary and proper" power could
be read accurately to infringe on certain rights unless affirmative pro-
tections were present 128 The Ninth Amendment, and the Bill of Rights
collectively, were apparently Madison's attempt to prevent Congress
alone from possessing the discretionary power of the "necessary and
proper" clause, 121 Rights were listed, therefore, to ensure their proper
protection, but not to elevate their status. 122
A House Select Committee, which included Madison, reviewed his
proposals and presented a streamlined version of the Ninth Amend-
ment. 123 This version no longer contained Madison's reference to pre-
venting constructive enlargement of federal power and, furthermore,
made no mention of government powers at all)" It did, however,
the hands of the general government, and were consequently insecure. This
is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the
admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, 1 conceive, that may be
guarded against_ I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the
last clause of the 4th resolution.
Id. At the time, the Ninth Amendment as it exists today was Madison's "Fourth Resolu-
tion." See Lash, supra note 12, at 349-50 n.78.
117 Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-79; see MASSEY, supra note 11,
at 69-70.
112 Lash, supra note 12, at 349-50 n.78. This language was very similar to many state
convention proposals. See id. at 358 & n.122.
119 See id. at 349-50 n.78.
120 Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 172; see also Lash, supra note 12, at
353. The rights specifically enumerated may have been listed just because they were so apt
to be infringed by broad, but otherwise valid, federal powers. See BAKNE'rr, supra note 11,
at 249.
121 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 178-79; see also Lash, supra
note 12, at 353. Madison did not go into great detail about what other rights were re-
tained, although his notes for the speech referred to the natural rights of the people. See
BA RNE-r-r, supra note 11, at 54-55.
122 Barnett, supra note 68, at 28-29.
122 See PATTERSON, supra note 68, at 14; Lash, supra note 12, at 368.
124 See Lash, supra note 12, at 349-50 n.78, 368-69.
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maintain the statement on how to construe the enumeration of rights
that is in the current version of the Ninth Amendment. 126
Madison told President Washington that the reason for this dele-
tion was the reciprocal nature of rights and powers. 126 As limiting pow-
ers adequately protected rights, conversely, protecting rights would ade-
quately and appropriately limit the federal powers.'" To reassure those
wary of the deletion, Madison used the final version one year later in a
speech before the House of Representatives to show that it could limit
federal power by arguing that the creation of the Bank of the United
States was unconstitutional. 128
III. THE VARIED NINTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
In general, the Bill of Rights was not a focal point of constitutional
law during the nineteenth century. 129 In 1819 the U.S. Supreme Court
in McCulloch v. Maryland did, however, greatly expand federal power
soon after the ratification of the Bill of Rights and the Ninth Amend-
ment by upholding the very government power that James Madison had
argued the Ninth Amendment prevented—federal power to create a
National Bank.'" The Court implicitly rejected one of the Ninth Amend-
155 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; Lash, sulnrt note 12, at 368. The Virginia convention
was especially concerned about the removal of the explicit prevention of expansive federal
power, and debated two more years because of this concern. Lash, supra note 12, at 333,
371, 380-81. Virginia Assembly member Hardin Burnley wrote to Madison that their chief
concern was that there was no mechanism for determining if a particular unentimeratecl
right was protected or not. See Lash, supra note 12, at 371-72 (citing Letter from Hardin
Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789)); id. at 380-81 (citing Entry of Dec. 12, 1789, in
JOURNAL or THE SENATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (RiC11111011d 1828)).
'" See Lash, supra note 12, at 374.
' 21 See MASSEY, supra note 1 l, at 62-63, 67; Lash, supra note 12, at 374.
128 See Lash, supra note 12, at 383-85 (citing James Madison, Speech in Congress Op-
posing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791)). Soon after this speech, the Virginia delegation
finally relented and ratified the full Bill of Rights, including the Ninth Amendment. See
RAKOVE, =MY/ note 10, at 193; Lash, supra note 12, al 392-93.
k29
 RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 194. The Bill of Rights did not apply to the states until
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which made many of these rights protections
equally applicable against state governments. See RAout. BERGER, THE 14TH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 5-7 (1989); see also Barran v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,
249-50 (1833) (holding that if Congress had tried to improve the constitutions of the
states as well to provide additional protections it clearly would have declared this in plain
language).
13° See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 316, 407 (1819); Lash, supra note 12, at 415-16. The
Court observed that the issue had passed through the legislature without significant de-
bate and was ultimately signed by then-President Madison, despite his earlier opposition.
See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 380. Madison would later assert that he signed the National Bank
into law only out of political necessity and not because he believed that creation of the
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ment's supposed purposes—preventing broad constructions of federal
power. 131
After this period, but before 1965, courts generally dealt with the
Ninth Amendment in adjudicating competing powers between federal
and state governments. 132 During the New Deal, from 1930 to 1936,
courts cited to the Ninth Amendment, generally in tandem with the
Tenth Amendment, as support for questioning the constitutionality of
federally implemented New Deal programs.'" This use of the Ninth
Amendment to protect states' rights eventually fell out of favor, however,
simply because the Ninth Amendment was superfluous to the Tenth
Amendment analysis. 134
A. The Emergence of Griswold v. Connecticut: Using the Ninth
Amendment to Protect Individual Rights
After the New Deal, the Ninth Amendment once again fell into
disfavor, despite calls from commentators for its use in protecting indi-
vidual rights. 135 Then, in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut, the U.S. Su-
Bank was constitutional. See Lash, supra note 12, at 414-15, 420 (citing Letter from James
Madison to Mr. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831)). The nature and language of the Constitution,
the McCulloch Court noted, only marked the outlines of federal powers generally; specifi-
cally, the exceptions to the enumerated federal powers implied that federal powers could
be given a broad consideration. See McCulloch, 17 U.S, at 407-08. According to the Court,
the founders omitted any restricting terms against a fair and just interpretation that the
federal powers could be extended to such necessities as the creation of a federal bank. See
id.
L51 See RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 125; STORY, supra note 78, at 696; Lash, supra note 12,
at 415-17.
in See State V. Antonio, 5 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) 562, 567-68, 570 (1816) (determining that
the power to punish persons passing counterfeit coins was a power retained by the states
according to the lack of enumeration of such power to the federal government, and in
light of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments); see also Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of
the Ninth Amendment, 83 Trx. L. Rxv. 597, 601-02 (2005) (stating that, during this time, the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments were used to assert state autonomy against federal inter-
vention).
155 Lash, supra note 132, at 679-84; see, e.g., Acme, Inc. v. Besson, 10 F. Supp. I, 6-7
(D.N.J. 1935) (invalidating federal legislation regulating the hours and wages of state
manufacturers); Hart Coal Corp. v. Sparks, 7 F. Supp. 16, 21 (W.D. Ky. 1934) (limiting
federal power to that expressly or impliedly given to the federal government, particularly
in light of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments).
1214 See Lash, supra note 132, at 602, 689.
135 See Lash, supra note 132, at 674, 680; see also Knowlton H. Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. U. 309, 309, 313-14 (1935-36) (contending that powers to
regulate various items need not necessarily be in either the federal or state government but
could reside solely with the people, and that the rights retained by the people were the natu-
ral rights of Englishmen). See generally PATTERSON, supra note 68 (advocating a revival of
Ninth Amendment jurisprudence). Patterson's influence in particular was far-reaching on
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preme Court finally gave a substantive review of the relevance of the
Ninth Amendment to unenumerated individual rights, in concurring
and dissenting opinions)" The majority held that there was an inher-
ent right of privacy that protected the intimate marital relationship)"
It stated that emanations or penumbras of various guarantees in the Bill
of Rights collectively created a zone of privacy in marriage)" These
included the right of association in the First Amendment; the prohibi-
tion against quartering soldiers in the Third Amendment; the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, paper, and effects, and
against unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment;
and the zone of privacy that a person may create by invoking the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment)" The Court then stated
simply the text of the Ninth Amendment as support for protecting the
right of privacy though the right is unenumerated in the Constitution.H°
Justice Goldberg contributed a much more substantial review of
the Ninth Amendment in his concurring opinion."' Justice Goldberg
referred to the Ninth Amendment as entirely the work of James Madi-
this topic. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490-91 n.6 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring). Nonetheless, prior to Griswold, only a couple of courts suggested that the Ninth
Amendment could serve as a repository of individual rights. See In n Guardianship of
Thompson, 32 Haw. 479, 485-86 (1932) (holding that the right of a father to have custody
and care of his child was not an inalienable and unwritten right of the type that could be
worthy of protection under the Ninth Amendment); see also Roman Catholic Archbishop v.
Baker, 15 P.2d 391, 395-96 (Or. 1932) (stating that the right to own property is an inherent
right based on history and in light of the Ninth Atnendment).
199 See 381 U.S. at 486-99 (Goldbergi., concurring); id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., con-
curring); id. at 507-27 (Black, j., dissenting); id. at 527-31 (Stewart,J., dissenting).
"7
 See id. at 484-86 (majority opinion) (striking down a Connecticut law that prohib-
ited the use of contraceptives). The Court also listed other rights it has protected, even
though they are not specifically listed in the text of the Constitution. See id. at 482. These
included the right to educate a child in a school of the parents' choice, see Pierce v. Soc'y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), and the right to distribute, receive, and read via
the First Amendment's freedom of speech and press, see Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
"9 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86. The right of privacy essentially exists from the
breadth of these more explicit protections. See id.
19 Id. at 484.
14° See id.; Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determining
Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due Process, 32 U. Baur. L. REV. 169, 175
(2003) (discussing the Ninth Amendment's use here as "left dangling").
141 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The impetus for Justice
Goldberg's reliance on the Ninth Amendment appears to be its rediscovery by Patterson in
The Forgotten Ninth Amendment. See id. at 490-91 n.6. At least one scholar predicted that the
state law at issue in Griswold would herald the Ninth Amendment as a source of protection
for individual rights. See Norman Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights ... Retained by the Peo-
ple"?, 37 N.Y.C. L. REV. 787, 804 (1962).
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son, who introduced it in Congress, and as having passed with little or
no debate and minimal change in language. 142
 The purpose of the
Ninth Amendment, he wrote, was to allay fears that a bill of enumer-
ated rights could not possibly cover all valid rights and would be con-
strued to deny others left unenumerated. 143 To argue that the tradi-
tional and historical right of privacy in marriage could be infringed just
because it was not enumerated in the Constitution would be to directly
ignore the construction mandated by the Ninth Amendment. 1"
Foremost, Justice Goldberg's contention was that the Ninth
Amendment shows that the individual liberties protected by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments are not exhaustively listed in the first
eight amendments to the Constitution.145 Despite its importance in fur-
thering rights analysis, however, the Ninth Amendment is not itself a
source of rights. 146 He acknowledged the Court's use of due process
protection of the rights contained in the first eight amendments, and
then used the Ninth Amendment to extend this protection to other
unenumerated rights. 147 Justice Goldberg's test was whether these un-
enumerated rights are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of the
people as to be fundamental.'"
Justice Harlan added a concurring opinion, which asserted that
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause analysis could stand
on its own as a protector of unenumerated rights. 149 It did not require
assistance from emanations of any of the enumerated rights or the
Ninth Amendment. 159
Justice Black dissented in Griswold and made the very argument
that the Ninth Amendment was designed to prevent—that privacy can-
not be a fundamental right because there is no provision in the Consti-
tution protecting 4. 151 He stated the Ninth Amendment was only in-
tended to protect against the idea that unenumerated rights were as-
l42 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see PATrEitsoN, supra note 68,
at 18.
145 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-89 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
144 Id. at 491-92.
145 Id. at 493; see U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702,720 (1997).
146 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
147 Id. at 487,488-93,
145 Id. at 493.
149 See id. at 500 (Harland, concurring).
no See id.
151 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 508-10 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that, although he en-
joys his own privacy, he accepts that the government has a right to invade it unless ex-
pressly prohibited).
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signed into the hands of the federal government and thus insecure.' 52
The power was, however, reserved to the states.'"
Justice Stewart also dissented and wrote that use of the Ninth
Amendment by the federal judiciary to strike down state law would
have caused Madison no little wonder because it had been written to
limit federal powers.' 54
 He then urged the people of Connecticut to
repeal this disfavored law through proper constitutional channels—using
their "Ninth and Tenth Amendment rights" to persuade their elected
representatives.' 55
B. Protecting Rights Through the Ninth Amendment After Griswold
Since Griswold, the Ninth Amendment has received a larger share
of judicial consideration among lower courts and concurring and dis-
senting Supreme Court opinions, although its usage has been fairly
inconsistent. 156
 Some of this inconsistency likely stems from the differ-
ing views found in Griswold itself . 157
1. The Ninth Amendment as a Source of Rights
A number of cases after Griswold used the Ninth Amendment as a
source of rights that are inherent in the constitutional structure. 158 In
1970, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
in United States v. Cook stated that the purpose of the Ninth Amend-
ment was to guarantee to individuals those rights that are not enu-
merated in the Bill of Rights, but that are inherent in citizenship in
democracies, such as the right to one's own life. 159 In the 1971 case of
Anderson v. Laird, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
152 Id. at 519-20.
in Id. at 520. Justice Black added that the Court's method of review would lead to un-
restrainable control of state law by the federal judiciary. Id. at 521-22.
154 Id. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 531.
06 See infra notes 158-183 and accompanying text. To date, there is no Supreme Court
opinion that provides binding precedent regarding the Ninth Amendment as it relates to
protecting individual rights. MASSEY, supra note 11, at 9-10; see infra notes 158-183 and
accompanying text.
157 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg,) 	 J., concurring) (stating that the Ninth
Amendment is not itself a repository of individual rights, even as he asserted the right to
privacy); id. at 531 (Stewart., J., dissenting) (referring to the people of Connecticut's Ninth
Amendment rights to persuade their elected representatives to repeal a law they did not
like, despite his criticisms of protecting unenumerated rights).
156 See infra notes 159-170 and accompanying text.
159 311 F. Supp. 618,620 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
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held that there is a Ninth Amendment right to grow hair the length
one desires, although it can be subordinate to military discretion. 160
Additionally, in a dissenting opinion in Palmer v. Thompson in 1971,
Supreme Court Justice Douglas, the author of the majority opinion in
Griswold, asserted that basic rights under the Ninth Amendment must
include things like a right to pure air and water, or the right to recrea-
tion by swimming. 161
In 1973 in Adler v. Montefiore Hospital Ass'n, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that there was a Ninth Amendment right for patients
to be treated by the physician of their choosing. 162 In 1974, in Lubin v.
Panish, Justice Douglas wrote in a concurring opinion that the right to
vote in state elections is historically "retained by the people" in the
Ninth Amendment. 163 In 1977, in Sorentino v. Family & Children's Ser-
vices, the New Jersey Supreme Court referred to the custody rights of
parents as Ninth Amendment rights. 164 A number of other courts have
implied that rights may be protected by the Ninth Amendment by de-
termining that certain asserted rights do not fall under this classifica-
don, including a right to smoke marijuana at home, 165 to a pollution-
free environment, 166 to have an unregistered machine gun, 167 and to be
able to enter into same-sex marriages. 168
More recently, Supreme Court Justice Scalia asserted that other
rights retained by the people under the Ninth Amendment do exist,
but that judges have no power to enforce them. 169 In Troxel v. Granville
in 2000, Justice Scalia wrote in a dissenting opinion that the right of
'5° 437 F.2d 912, 914-15 (7th Cir. 1971); see also Murphy v. Pocatello Sch. Dist., 480
P.2d 878, 884 (Idaho 1971) (holding that Ninth Amendment rights should be left to judi.
cial determination just as the liberty interests of the Fourteenth Amendment are). But see
Kraus v. Bd. of Edttc., 492 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Mo. 1973) (holding that regulation of men's
hair length was not violative of the Ninth Amendment).
tfit 403 U.S. 217, 233-34 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas's particular
contention in this opinion was that freedom from discrimination based on race, creed, or
color had become, by reason of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments,
one of the unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 237.
'52 311 A.2d 634, 642 (Pa. 1973) (holding, however, that the public hospital's use of
particular surgeons for difficult tasks was not violative of this Ninth Amendment right).
163
 415 U.S. 709, 721 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring).
154 378 A.2c1 18, 20-21 (NJ. 1977).
165 See Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898, 903-04 (Mass. 1969).
166 See Concerned Citizens of Neb. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coman, 970 F.2d 421,
426-27 (8th Cir. 1992).
167 See United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 108 (6th Cir. 1976).
I" See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971).
169 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000) (Scalia, j., dissenting).
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parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among the other
rights retained by the people in the Ninth Amendment. 170
2. The Ninth Amendment Protecting Rights Found Elsewhere in the
Constitution
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Ninth Amend-
ment is a savings clause that affords courts the ability to protect un-
enumerated rights."' In Stanley v. Illinois in 1972, the Court followed
Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold, holding that the Ninth
Amendment provides support for a Fourteenth Amendment claim to
liberty protection. 172 Some courts have simply acknowledged Griswold's
penumbra determination of fundamental rights and used the Ninth
Amendment as support for this assertion)" More recently, in United
States v. Extreme Associates in 2005, the Third Circuit upheld a federal
statute that regulated the distribution of obscenity, after considering
the constitutional right of privacy which, the court stated, was embod-
ied in the Ninth Amendment and the Griswold line of cases."4
Other courts have noted more generally the Ninth Amendment's
overarching irnportance. 176 In 1980 in Charles v. Brown, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama held that although the
Ninth Amendment does not itself specify rights, it prevents unenumer-
ated rights from being lowered, degraded, or rejected simply because
they were unenumerated. 176
 In Grossman u Gilchrist in 1981, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois described the Ninth
Amendment as having been drafted to cope with the fear that rights
had been omitted from the Bill of Rights and that ambiguities of lan-
guage might adversely affect rights that were intended to be included."'
In 1984 in Massachusetts v. Upton, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stevens
170 Id. Justice Scalia argued that, although he was a judge, he nonetheless had no
power to deny the legal effect of rules that infringed only unenumerated rights. Id. at 92.
171
 SeeStanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
172 See id. (supporting the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents to the care,
custody, and management of their children, under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
172 See benShalom v. Sec'y of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 975-76 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Mer-
liken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
174 431 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2005).
175 See infra notes 176-179 and accompanying text
t76 495 F. Supp. 862, 863-64 (N.D. Ala. 1980). In 1991, the Sixth Circuit in Gibson a Mat-
thews supported the Charles opinion regarding the Ninth Amendment. See 926 F.2d 532, 537
(6th Cir. 1991).
177 519 F. Supp. 173, 176-77 (N.D. III. 1981).
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wrote in his concurring opinion that the Ninth Amendment goes to the
core of the constitutional structure. 178 He criticized the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court for using the enumeration in the federal Con-
stitution to disparage rights retained by the people of Massachusetts
that, in this case, were whatever the state court ultimately determined
those rights to be.'"
Also, although the Supreme Court has rarely mentioned the Ninth
Amendment, it has specifically acknowledged, and subsequently ig-
nored, a number of Ninth Amendment claims to protection. 180 The Su-
preme Court in Roe v. Wade in 1973 only acknowledged the preceding
lower court's use of the Ninth Amendment as a basis for the right of a
woman to have an abortion, in light of the right of privacy established in
Griswo/d. 181 But later, in the 1986 case of Bowers v. Hardwick, which has
subsequently been overruled, the Court specifically disagreed with the
circuit court, which had used the Ninth Amendment to invalidate a law
that criminalized sodomy. 182 The Eleventh Circuit, in Hardwick v. Bowers
in 1985, held that the conduct criminalized by Georgia involved impor-
tant associational interests that were beyond the reach of state regula-
tion and protected by the Ninth Amendment. 183
C. Brief Overview of How the Ninth Amendment Is Viewed
Outside the Courtroom
If Griswold ignited discussion about the Ninth Amendment, the
testimony during the Robert Bork Supreme Court confirmation hear-
178 466 U.S. 727, 737 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
179 Id. at 737-38.
180 See, e.g., Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 409 (2002) (ignoring a Ninth Amend-
ment claim to a right to family integrity); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyer's Coop.,
532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001) (ignoring a Ninth Amendment claim to a right to possession of
marijuana); United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 723 (1992) (ignoring a Ninth Amend-
ment claim to a right to desegregated public schools).
1B1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120, 153 (1973); see, Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189,
192 (C.D. Utah 1973) (supporting the right of privacy by referencing the Ninth Amend-
ment); Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 805 (D. Conn. 1972) (stating that the right of
privacy's basis is imprecise, but is either grounded in the Ninth Amendment, or the pe-
numbras of the Bill of Rights and the Ninth Amendment, as incorporated by the Four-
teenth Amendment), vacated on other grounds, 410 U.S. 951 (1973).
182 See 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578
(2003); see also Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
183 Hardwick 760 F.2d at 1212-13, rev'd, 478 U.S. 186, overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
578.
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ings of 1987 set it ablaze. 184
 Judge Bork controversially referred to the
Ninth Amendment as an ink blot that could not be used because the
framers of the Constitution did not provide any method by which to
apply it. 185
 Like Justice Scalia after him, Judge Bork stated that he felt
judges had no power to enforce unenumerated rights. 186
 His testimony
struck a disruptive chord and he ultimately was not confirmed. 187
Despite the vigor with which the Ninth Amendment was debated
in 1987, it was essentially ignored by Supreme Court nominees John
Roberts and Samuel Alito in their 2005 and 2006 confirmation hear-
ings, as well as by the Senators questioning them. 188 Chief Justice Rob-
ens did not once mention the Ninth Amendment, nor was he asked
about it, even when discussing the right to privacy held fundamental in
Griswold.'" Both he and Justice Alito stated that substantive due process
analysis has overtaken the penumbras and emanations argument of the
majority in Griswold for unenumerated rights analysis. 19° The Senators
seemed content with this outlook, so long as the nominees respected
that a right to privacy exists. 191
184
 See Nomination of Robert H. Bark to Be Associate Justke of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 117 (1989) (testimony of
Robert Bork), reprinted in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 441-
42 app. B [hereinafter Bork Confirmation Hearings]; Barnett, supra note 10, at 1; supra notes
136-157 and accompanying text.
lo Bork Confirmation Hearings, supra note 184, at 441 app. B. Judge Bork's specific
statement on the Ninth Amendment was:
[I]f you had an amendment that says "Congress shall snake no" and then there
is an ink blot and you can not read the rest of it and that is the only copy you
have, I do not think the court can make up what might be under the ink blot if
you can not read it.
Id.
186 See 7'roxel, 530 U.S. at 91-92 {Scalia, J., dissenting); Bork Confirmation Hearings, supra
note 184, at 441-42 app. B.
187 See Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 Clit.-KP.NT L. REV. 211,
211 (1988).
188
 See generally U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Judge John Roberts's Nomination to
the Supreme Court (2005), littp://www.washingtonpost.cons/wp-dyn/content/linkset/2005/
09/14/L12005091402149.111.nd [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing]; U.S. Senatejudiciary
Committee Hearing on Judge Samuel Alito's Nomination to the Supreme Court (2006), http://blogs.
washingtoisposicom/campaignforthecourt/2006/01/heming_transcr.html
 [hereinafter Alito
Confirmation Hearing).
189
 See Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 188, at Day I (Sept. 12), Day 2, pt. VI
(Sept. 13).
190 See id. at Day 1 (Sept. 12), Day 2, pt. VI (Sept. 13); Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra
note 188, at Day 2, pt. I ( Jan. 10), Day 3, pt. 1 (Jan. 11).
191 See Roberts Confirmation Hearing supra note 188, at Day 1 (Sept. 12), Day 2, pt. VI
{Sept. 13); Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 188, at Day 2, pt. I (Jan. 10), Day 3, pt. 1
(Jan. 11).
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Between the Bork and Alito hearings, a number of notable books
and articles added to the history and discussion of the Ninth Amend-
ment. 192 One view holds that the Ninth Amendment is merely a further
check on expansive federal power and does not protect lights directly.'"
Another view is that the Ninth Amendment is an affirmative protector
of rights, potentially protecting all natural rights as fundamental. 194 The
debate on the Ninth Amendment generally focuses on the history and
original meaning of the Ninth Amendment. 195 Many authors espouse
sharply different viewpoints despite employing much of the same back-
ground history.'" When members of the Supreme Court have actually
analyzed the Ninth Amendment, however, they have viewed it as a pro-
tector of rights in some way. 197
IV. EMPLOYING THE NINTH AMENDMENT TO SUPPLEMENT
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
' The current unenumerated rights test is unpredictable because it
lacks guideposts and considers only fundamental rights; as a result, pro-
tecting all rights is put on tenuous ground.'" There has not been an
02 See generally, e.g., BARNrrr, supra note 11; MASSEY, supra note 11; Lash, supra note
12; Lash, supra note 132; McAffee, supra note 68.
155 See McAlice, supra note 68, at 1219-20. Some commentators assert that substantive
due process review—protecting fundamental rights through the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment protections of liberty—is an acceptable test for protecting rights as required
by the Ninth Amendment. See, e.g., William 0, Bertelsman, The Ninth Amendment and Due
Process of Law—Toward a Viable Theory of Unenumerated Rights, 37 U. CIN. L. Rev. 777, 787
(1968); Cameron Matheson, Note, The Once and Future Ninth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. Rr.v.
179, 198 (1996).
154 See BARNETT, supra note 11, at 235. This view holds that the Ninth Amendment pro-
vides that the natural rights of the people must be fully protected as fundamental. See id. at
54, 235. This could mean that the Ninth Amendment protects the natural personal auton-
omy rights of the people with the same vigor as any enumerated right in the Bill of Rights.
See id. For Professor Barnett, natural rights generally mean the right to act within one's
autonomy unless or until one's behavior begins to harm others. Id. at 261-62. There was a
belief at the founding of the Constitution that the people possessed their full scope of
rights before the formation of governments, and only handed over certain powers. PAT-
TERSON, supra note 68, at 19-20. The Ninth Amendment also has been used to define fac-
tors for recognizing the existence of unenumerated rights and determining which deserve
protection. See Andrew King, Comment, What the Supreme Court Isn't Saying About Federalism,
the Ninth Amendment, and Medical Marijuana, 59 ARK. L. REY. 755, 759 (2006).
155 See generally BARNwrr, supra note 11; Lash, supra note 12; McAffee, supra note 68.
15(1 Barnett, supra note 68, at 5.
157 See supra notes 137, 163, 170-171, 179, 181 and accompanying text.
155 See BARNETT, soar note 11, at 230-34; MASSEY, supra note 11, at 159-60; THOMAS B.
MCAFFEF. ET AL., POWERS RESERVED FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE STATES: A HISTORY OF THE
NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS 238-39 (2006). For a review of the differing and inconsis-
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outright declaration of a newly protected fundamental right in the past
thirty years. 19° Nonfundamental rights, meanwhile, are ignored. 2°°
To alleviate these concerns, courts should use the Ninth Amend-
ment to supplement the substantive due process analysis in evaluating
unenumerated rights."' Courts should use the Ninth Amendment's
history to supplement the limited guideposts observed from the his-
tory of the narrowly defined interest at stake in the particular case.=
They should also accept the history of the Ninth Amendment as show-
ing that nonfundamental unenumerated rights should be recognized
alongside fundamental rights. 203
Employing the Ninth Amendment to supplement substantive due
process should not drastically alter the test under this doctrine. 204
 The
supplemented test, discussed in Section B below, simply considers the
history and traditions of unenumerated rights more generally and al-
lows for nonfundamental rights to receive some—though limited—
formal protection from government interference. 205
tent ways that unenumerated rights are protected, see supra notes 26-59,129-183 and ac-
companying text
19° See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,720 (1997); supra notes 26-59 and ac-
companying text.
200 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-22; Rubin, supra note 26, at 844. It could be argued
that the Court has recognized nonfundamental rights to refuse medical treatment and to
have privacy as to intimate sexual conduct between adults. See Lawrence V. Texas, 539 U.S.
558,578 (2003); Cruzan V. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,279,281 (1990).
201 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-22 (outlining the current test); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479,491-92 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also PATTERSON, supra note
68, at 19-20; Federal Fanner, Letter XVI, supra note 92, at 134-35.
202 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (describing the Court's reluctance to expand the
area of substantive due process because of the lack of guideposts for decision making);
Am/kit, supra note 84, at 329 (discussing different areas of constitutional law to which
courts can turn in determining unenumerated rights).
2°' See ANIAR, supra note 84, at 327-28 (contending that the Ninth Amendment helps
protect rights that are implicit in the general structure of the Constitution or implied in
conjunction with enumerated rights); RAKOVF., supra note 10, at 125-26 (noting the im-
portance of protecting rights so as to limit government powers); see also Statement of Rep.
Sedgwick, supra note 10, at 8-9; Iredell's Speech in the North Carolina Convention, supra
note 10, at 145-46.
2°4 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (employing substantive
due process to find a right to privacy, with the support of the Ninth Amendment's history);
infra notes 271-303 and accompanying text (outlining this Note's proposed test and pro-
viding an example for its use).
2°3 See infra notes 271-288 and accompanying text.
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A. Why Supplementing Substantive Due Process Is important
The current test under the substantive due process doctrine—the
Washington v. Glucksberg test—goes a long way towards achieving the
consideration of unenumerated rights that James Madison and the
state conventions intended when advocating for a Bill of Rights. 206 The
test, however, is unpredictable partly because it is incomplete. 207 It is
incomplete, first, because it lacks guideposts for responsible decision
making in the area of unenumerated rights. 208 Secondly, the test is in-
complete because it focuses solely on fundamental rights. 209
Unpredictability is one of the common criticisms of substantive
due process.21° Courts—and representative governments on the legis-
lative end—must consider whether a right, which is not even firmly
defined until a court makes its legal determination, has the support of
tradition and history. 2" The Ninth Amendment's history and struc-
tural scheme can somewhat limit the unpredictable nature of the sub-
stantive due process doctrine. 212 It may also provide additional justifi-
cations for courts making such unenumerated rights determinations
at all rather than only legislatures. 213
The current test under substantive due process provides an all-or-
nothing approach towards individual rights because it recognizes only
206 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-22; Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at
178-79; see also BARNETT, supra note 11, at 55; MCAFFEE ET Al.., supra note 198, at 238-39;
Lash, supra note 12, at 358 n.122,391-92.
207 See McAFEEE ET AL., supra note 198, at 236 (describing the current confusion cre-
ated by Supreme Court jurisprudence in the unenumerated rights area).
208 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21. Courts should be more interested in establishing
guideposts then, rather than not applying any test at all. See RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 125-
26 (noting state convention delegates' concerns that a bill of rights was necessary to serve as
guideposts for showing when the federal government had overstepped its appropriate
bounds).
2°9 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-22; RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 125-26 (noting the im-
portance of protecting rights so as to limit government powers); Statement of Rep. Sedg-
wick, supra note 10, at 8-9; lredell's Speech in the North Carolina Convention, supra note
10, at 145-46.
210 Patrick M. Garry, A Different Model for the Right to Privacy: The Political Question Doc-
trine as a Substitute for Substantive Due Process, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 169,192-94 (2006) (dis-
cussing the Lawrence v. Texas decision overruling Bowers a Hardwick and the disfavored
"first era" of substantive due process, which occurred during the New Deal); see also Rubin,
supra note 26, at 837-39.
211 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-22; see also MCAFFEE ET AL., supra note 198, at 236.
sts See BARNETC, supra note 11, at 234-42; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
2" See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-79; see also Roosevelt, su-
pra note 23, at 1000-02.
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fundamental rights. 214
 This, in turn, encourages rather than dissuades
the current trepidation about expanding judicial protection of rights. 215
The lack of clear guideposts is particularly important because decisions
acknowledging new fundamental rights have far-reaching and contro-
versial implications that may often give courts pause. 216
1. The Lack of Proper Guideposts
Under current substantive due process analysis, the Supreme
Court does not consider the Ninth Amendment's broader history relat-
ing to unenumerated rights. 217
 Because of this lack of guideposts for
decision making and the ramifications of asserting an interest to be
fundamental, courts must proceed cautiously.'" Courts, fiwther, nar-
rowly define the liberty interest or right at stake. 219
 Thus, because sub-
stantive due process relies solely on the tradition and history of the
narrowly defined interest but not the additional history of unenumer-
ated rights generally, its use greatly prevents an accurate and complete
analysis of rights protection. 2"
Further guideposts for unenumerated rights analysis should come
from the textual source of unenumerated rights itself: the Ninth Amend-
eta See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-22; Robert Chesney, Old Wine or New? The Shocks-the-
Conscience Statulard and the Distinction Between Legislative and Executive Action, 50 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 981, 983 n.14 (2000) (citing Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996), for the
proposition that the consequence for a litigant failing to demonstrate that an asserted
right is fundamental is that the Court will often conduct no real review at all).
215 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (stating that rights analysis must proceed cautiously
because of the lack of guideposts); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating his hesitation to remove unenumerated rights protection
from the legislative forum).
2" See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720;
Thomas B. McAffee, A Critical Guide to the Ninth Amendment, 69 TEMP. L. RENT. 61, 63-65
(1996).
217 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-22; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., con-
curring) (contending that substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment can
stand on its own, without support from the Ninth Amendment).
216 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (noting that calling a right fundamental essentially
places it outside the arena of public debate and legislative action); see also BARNETT, supra
note 11, at 235 (discussing the judicial fears associated with employing an open-ended
clause like the Ninth Amendment).
RIB Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
nu See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 568-70; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 709, 722-23; Lofton v.
Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819-20 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding
that even if the assumptions underlying the government's belief in preventing homosexu-
als from adopting are wrong, the mere fact that they can be argued is sufficient to pass
rational basis review); AMAR, supra note 84, at 329; see also BARNETT, supra note 11, at 230-
34.
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ment. 221 The Ninth Amendment was specifically written to ensure at
least some consideration of rights unenumerated in the Constitution. 222
The Ninth Amendment's history provides the history and traditions as
to unenumerated rights generally that current substantive due process
analysis lacks, and it comes directly from the Constitution's founders. 228
James Madison was convinced to add the Bill of Rights to the Constitu-
tion, with the Ninth Amendment as a residual clause, because he was
persuaded that it was better to protect some rights strongly and others
weakly than not to protect any directly at al1.224
In other legal disciplines, courts often review and consider the
character of the enumerated items and the purpose of the relevant re-
sidual clause to define unenumerated items. 225 For example, the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence provide that all hearsay evidence is inadmissible
in court, unless the hearsay fits a particular exception. 226 The drafters
of the Federal Rules recognized, however, that the list of hearsay excep-
tions could never be complete, and so they added a "residual excep-
tion" to allow courts to admit hearsay that the drafters had inadver-
tently left out or not yet considered. 227 Similarly, the enumeration prob-
lem arises in many private contractual arrangements, such as financial
lenders' security agreements drafted pursuant to state versions of Arti-
cle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, where omnibus clauses are
used as catch-ails to ensure that unenumerated collateral is included in
the lending contract. 228 These comparisons are admittedly imperfect,
221 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-89, 491-92 (Goldberg, J., concurring); AMAR, supra
note 84, at 328 & n.*.
222 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 178-79; see also MASSEY, supra
note 11, at 13; Lash, supra note 12, at 363; supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
2" See Glurksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (urging caution in determining unenumerated rights
because there are limited guideposts for proper decision making); Madison's Bill of Rights
Speech, supra note 10, at 178-79 (outlining Madison's views on the Ninth Amendment);
supra notes 77-128 and accompanying text (describing the ratification histories of the Bill
of Rights and the Ninth Amendment).
224 RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 164; Letter from Jefferson to Madison, supra note 112, at
165-66.
"5 See infra notes 226-229 and accompanying text.
226 FED. R. Evin. 802. Hearsay is a statement made out of court that is offered as evi-
dence in court to prove the truth of the flatter asserted. Id. 801(c).
227 See id. 807; id. 803(24) advisory committee's note; id. 807 advisory committee's
note; Turbyfill v. hiel Harvester Co., 486 F. Stipp. 232, 234 (F.D. Mich. 1980) (stating that
a residual exception must be consistent with the policy underlying Rule 803).
228 See U .C.C. § 9-108(b) (2005) (describing an omnibus clause as having a reasonable
classification if it sufficiently describes the category of the collateral in which a security
interest is taken); see also Citizens Bank & Trust v. Gibson Lumber Co., 96 B.R. 751, 753
(W.D. Ky. 1989) (holding that, tinder the Kansas Uniform Commercial Code, omnibus
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but they do provide examples of courts' willingness to accept and in-
terpret residual clauses in other contexts. 229
In the unenumerated rights context, courts should look at the
purposes behind the addition of the various enumerated rights in the
Bill of Rights and the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution. 230 The
Glucksberg Court has already stated that the unenumerated fundamen-
tal rights established by the Court provide guidance as to the outlines
of liberty supplied by substantive due process. 231
 Likewise, the drafters
of the Constitution included certain fundamental rights in the Bill of
Rights because they were so apt to be infringed by invalid or seemingly
valid exercises of federal power. 232
 A significant body of scholarly work
has buttressed the known history of the Ninth Amendment and, ac-
cordingly, of unenumerated rights. 233
 This history can provide clearer
guideposts than the current Glucksberg test, which even the Supreme
Court admits is lacking. 234
Foremost, the direct correlation between rights and powers di-
rectly informed Madison in drafting the Ninth Amendment. 235
 Where
rights ended, powers began; where powers ended, rights began. 23G Be-
clauses, in principle, can adequately describe unenumerated items fin' a security agree-
ment).
229
 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 807, fur example, a court determines whether an
offered piece of hearsay evidence is similar enough to the enumerated hearsay exceptions
in the Federal Rules because it provides the same guarantees of trustworthiness. See FELL R.
Evin. 807; id. 803(24) advisory committee's note. This would be akin to courts using the
first eight amendments to the U.S. Constitution as guideposts for determining other fun-
damental rights because of the language of the Ninth Amendment. Cf. id. 807; id. 803(24)
advisory committee's note.
239
 See Clucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 (describing the judicially determined unenumerated
fundamental rights as guideposts for substantive due process analysis); (f. Turbyfill, 486 F.
Stipp. at 234 (stating that an unenumerated hearsay exception must be consistent with the
policy underlying the rule for listed hearsay exceptions).
251 521 U.S. at 722.
232
 See BititNErr, supra note 11, at 249; RAKOVE, saps note 10, at 125-26 (citing the ex-
ample of freedom of the press, which the Stamp Act of 1765 had put at risk); STORY, supra
note 78, at 696; Federal Farmer, Letter XVI, supra note 92, at 133-35.
2's See BAusErr, supra note 11, at 234 (commenting on the significant rise in scholarly
consideration of the Ninth Amendment since the Judge Bork Supreme Court confirma-
tion hearing); supra notes 77-128,192-196 and accompanying text.
224 See 521 U.S. at 720-22 (tempering expansion of substantive due process analysis be-
cause of the lack of guideposts for decision making).
255 See MASSEY, supra note 11, at 67-68; Lash, supra note 12, at 374 (citing Letter from
James Madison to George Washington (Nov. 20, 1789)).
236 See SToRY, supra note 78, at 693-94; Lash, supra note 12, at 348. The people handed
over only certain rights and privileges upon the formation of government—enumerated
powers to the federal government and broad, but not limitless, police powers to the state
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cause courts now rarely protect rights by limiting powers—as Madison
would have expected—more affirmative protections are necessary to
achieve the Ninth Amendment's original purpose. 237 Courts may also
find relevant in their determinations of unenumerated rights that, for
example: (1) the purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to ensure that
the Bill of Rights was not treated as an exhaustive list; 238 (2) both Fed-
eralists and Antifederalists knew not all valid rights could be enumer-
ated;239 (3) Madison was concerned about the legislature having full
control over the interpretations of its potentially expansive powers; 24°
and (4) Madison referred to the other rights retained by the people as
their natural rights in his notes to his Bill of Rights speech in the
House.241
2. The Value of Recognizing Nonfundamental Rights
The Supreme Court decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v.
Texas, which overruled Bowers just seventeen years later, provide an ex-
ample of the unpredictability of substantive due process's all-or-nothing
approach.242 The Lawrence Court defined the same asserted liberty in-
terest differently than the Bowers Court and thus reached a different
result.243 The decisions in Glucksberg, which denied a right to physician-
assisted suicide, and Roe v. Wade, which affirmed a right to have an
abortion in light of the right to privacy, each seem to rest on the same
governments. See BARNErr, supra note 11, at 55; PATTERSON, supra note 68, at 19. Pre-
sumably, then, the people can also take them back. See ArviAR, supra note 84, at 327.
237 See MCAFEEE ET AL., supra note 198, at 2 (contending the Ninth Amendment's pri-
mary purpose was to limit overly broad interpretations of federal powers). Compare United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (granting a presumption of
constitutionality to state government legislation), and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 316, 407 (1819) {stating that there was no clause in the Constitution restrict-
ing just interpretations of the federal power), with Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d
47, 49-50 (Pa. 1980) (limiting state police power to protect sexual privacy rights).
2" See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-79.
2" See Statement of Rep. Sedgwick, supra note 10, at 8-9; Iredell's Speech in the North
Carolina Ratification Convention, supra note 10, at 145-46; see also Federal Farmer, Letter
XVI, supra note 92, at 134-35.
240 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-78; see also RAKOVE, supra
note 10, at 125.
241 Set BARNETT, supra note 11, at 54-55.
242 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), over-
ruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Culhane, supra note 57, at 496; Garry, supra note 210, at
192-93.
243 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567; see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190; Culhane, supra note 57, at 496.
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shaky grounds that Bowers did—if the asserted liberty interest is merely
defined differently by a later Court, these results may be overruled. 244
This unpredictability may stem from the Court's use of a test that
recognizes only fundamental rights, and presents the plaintiffs with an
all-or-nothing option. 245
 Had the Bowers Court held that there was at
least a nonfundamental right to engage in adult consensual sexual ac-
tivity in the privacy of one's home, but that the state government could
invade that privacy on valid police power grounds, the subsequent Law-
rence Court could have focused on the facts and evidence pertaining to
that police power justification. 246 Instead, the Lawrence Court resorted to
an unspecific definition of a general liberty interest, even denying the
legitimacy of the traditional state police power to regulate public moral-
ity, so that the majority could reach a decision it felt appropriate.247
The liberty interest in Lawrence was essentially general and non-
fundamental, but the Court did not provide guideposts for how to de-
termine the limits or to ensure the protection of such a broad and un-
defined liberty interest. 248
 This nonfundamental liberty interest could
still, presumably, be limited in traditional public order situations—such
as prostitution or public displays of sex acts—but not in others, such as
acts between two consenting adults in the privacy of the home. 249
 Law-
rence provided little in the way of guidance for future decisions. 25°
As discussed below in Section B, the existence of nonfundamental
rights does not have to obliterate the presumption of constitutionality
for legislative actions, nor should it necessarily lead to an uncontrolla-
ble and even more unpredictable discussion of individual rights by the
244 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06, 723; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The
shaky ground that these decisions rest on is the particularity of the definition that is at-
tached to any asserted liberty interest. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723; Roe, 410 U.S. at 153;
cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (overturning the decision in Bowers after redefining the as-
serted liberty interest).
245
 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-22; Chesney, supra note 214, at 983 /1.14.
246
 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 570; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190; Bonadio, 915 A.2d at 49—
51 (considering evidence of whether legislation prohibiting particular sexual acts passed
the public requirements of the police power).
247
 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 571, 578; see also Kalscheur, supra note 59, at 3. But see
Goldberg, supra note 57, at 1234-36 (contending that courts stopped accepting moral
justifications without empirical evidence long before Lawrence).
242
 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 578; Culhane, supra note 57, at 494-97; Hunter, supra
note 57, at 1113-14.
249 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Culhane, supra note 57, at 497-98.
25° See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563-79; see also Kalscheur, supra note 59, at 3; Brian Haw-
kins, Note, The Glucksberg-
 Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105
MICH. L. REV. 409, 410-11 (2006) (describing courts' disinterest in using Lawrence to guide
constitutional interpretation).
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courts. 251 The ability of courts to recognize a nonfundamental right
would, however, limit the harm of the current all-or-nothing approach
which narrowly defines an asserted interest, and, thus, the severity and
likelihood of unpredictable and unstable results. 252
A number of courts have already resorted to finding support for the
existence of nonfundamental rights either under the Ninth Amendment
or with its support. 253 These courts have employed the Ninth Amend-
ment because certain rights seem intuitive to the nature of being citi-
zens.254 These rights seem as intuitive as the right to wear a hat or wake
up when one pleases, tights that certain Constitutional Convention dele-
gates considered so understood and accepted—though not necessarily
fundamental—as not to require enumeration in the Constitution to be
protected back in 1789. 255 The Ninth Amendment was Madison's direct
effort to ensure that the enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights did not by itself disparage others not so listed. 256 It was not meant
231
 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563-79 (declaring a nonfundamental, but broad and gen-
eral liberty interest while still employing the substantive due process doctrine); Clucksterg,
521 U.S. at 719-22 (outlining the current test under substantive due process); Griswold,
381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (employing the Ninth Amendment as support
for substantive due process in the right of privacy context); see also Carolene Prods., 304 U.S.
at 152 & n.9 (proclaiming the presumption of constitutionality for state legislation).
252 See BARNF:rr, supra note 11, at 233-34; MASSEY, supra note 11, at 98-99, 159-61; see
also MCAFFEE VT Al.., supra note 198, at 238-39. The particularity of the definition that is
attached to an asserted liberty interest coupled with a review of only the traditions and
history of that asserted right lead to the shaky ground upon which some substantive due
process decisions rely. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 5(16-68 (overturning the decision in Rowers
after redefining the asserted liberty interest); Glurksbetg, 521 U.S. at 723 (defining an as-
serted interest as a right to physician-assisted suicide, rather than a right to die); Roe, 410
U.S. at 153 (defining an asserted interest as a right to privacy; rather than a right to have
an abortion).
ens
	
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912,
914-15 (7th Cir. 1971); Charles v. Brown, 495 F. Supp. 862,863-64 (N.D. Ala. 1980).
254 See Anderson, 437 F.2c1 at 914-15 (stating a nonfundamental right to grow hair the
length of one's choosing); United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618, 620 (W.D. Pa. 1970)
(holding that the purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to guarantee to individuals those
rights inherent to citizenship in democracies that are not enumerated in the Bill of
Rights); Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n, 311 A.2d 634,642 (Pa. 1973) (describing a Ninth
Amendment right to be treated by the physician of one's choosing).
255 See Statement. of Rep. Sedgwick, supra note 10, at 8-9; Iredell's Speech in the North
Carolina Convention, supra note 10, at 146. Recently, one court held that there is no con-
stitutional right to dance, although the court did review generally the state's justifications
for laws prohibiting cabaret-style dancing. Festa v. N.Y. City Dcp't of Consumer Affairs, 820
N.Y.S.2d 452,461 (App. Div. 2006) (holding that this type of dancing did not fall under the
First Amendment's freedom of speech protection).
255 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-79.
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to elevate the status of the enumerated rights, at the expense of other
rights or even generally.257
3. Why Use the Ninth Amendment?
The Supreme Court has found ways to protect certain unenumer-
ated rights—such as the fundamental rights to have children and to
have marital privacy—as much as it protects enumerated rights.258 This
in and of itself is a testament to the overarching significance of the
Ninth Amendment's call not to disparage unenumerated rights just
because they are unenumerated.2" Ignoring the Ninth Amendment
simply leaves the issue of unenumerated rights to the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, neither of which was written directly to address
that constitutional concern. 26°
Although the substantive due process doctrine has grown in accep-
tance, doubts remain as to how well judges can determine unenumer-
ated rights and affirmatively protect them. 261
 If substantive due process
is not used to determine unenumerated rights, however, courts are left
essentially with no unenumerated rights test. 262
 If the Ninth Amend-
ment is held to show that the Constitution requires some unenumer-
ated rights test, courts can move to the question of whether use of sub-
stantive due process is the proper test.263
 The cases using the Ninth
2" Barnett, supra note 68, at 33-35; see The Slaughter-House Gases, 83 U.S. 36,118-19
(1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (stating -
 that the rights of the people did not require enu-
meration in the Constitution to deserve constitutional protection).
258
 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481,484 (protecting the fundamental unenumerated right
to marital privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,535,541 (1942)
(protecting the fundamental unenumerated right to have children).
250
 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 179 (arguing that a bill of
rights would encourage judges to especially protect the rights actually listed); see also Letter
from Jefferson to Madison, supra note 112, at 166.
2°° See MASS1CY, supra note 11, at 15-16; Roosevelt, supra note 23, at 1000-01. At least
one Supreme Court Justice and several commentators, however, have suggested that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to protect
unenumerated rights. See U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § 1; The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at
95-96 (Field, J., dissenting); BARNETT, supra note 11, at 193-202; Lawrence B. Solum, The
Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Derisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Un-
enumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. 155,164 (2006). Although relevant, a broader dis-
cussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
2° 1 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-23;
MC.AFFEIT ET Al.., supra note 198, at 237.
262 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that judges may not
protect any unenumerated rights, thus implying that no unenumerated rights test can be
valid); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-23; McAEEEE rr Al.„ supra note 198, at 237.
263
 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-22 (outlining the current test); Cristvaki, 381 U.S. at
484-86 (outlining a penumbras and emanations test); AMAR, supra note 84, at 328-29
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Amendment to defend nonfundamental rights show the country's deep
need to protect rights beyond the specific list in the Constitution.264
Lastly, there is significant confusion among lower courts and even
particular Supreme Court Justices about how to treat the Ninth Amend-
ment and nonfundamental rights. 266 Currently, some Justices and schol-
ars believe that there are unenumerated rights, but these rights cannot
be protected by judges. 266 Others consider the Ninth Amendment to be
a core principle of rights analysis.267 Recent Court appointees and the
majority of courts, however, ignore it. 268 Yet some judges do see the
Ninth Amendment as a repository of rights, including even nonftmda-
mental rights. 268 If courts are to give meaning to every clause of the
Constitution, as Marintry v. Madison requires, they should not let the
Ninth Amendment—one of the last stumbling blocks for final approval
of the Constitution and a reason why Madison relented on the addition
of a bill of rights at all—to continue to be ignored and disparaged. 2"
(suggesting that courts should look to the collective decisions of the people over time,
through state constitutions and lived traditions, for unenumerated rights); BARN/v.1-r, .supra
note 11, at 237-42 (outlining a fundamental natural rights theory for unenumerated
rights).
264 See MASSEY, supra note 11, at 5 (stating that "id here seems to be a deep need in the
American character to preserve and protect some quantum of individual liberty not oth-
erwise specifically accounted For in the charter of our liberties"); supra notes 156-183 and
accompanying text. Even judges who say they cannot, as judges, use the Ninth Amendment
actively to defend unenumerated rights still refer to Ninth Amendment rights or other
rights retained by the people as a separate category. See Troxe4 530 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 530-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
265 See McAFFEF. ET AL., supra note 198, at 236; supra notes 156-197 and accompanying
text (describing the variety of ways in which the Ninth Amendment has been used).
266 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bork Confirmation Hearings, supra
note 184, at 441 app. B; Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment: The &droning Mirage, 42 RuT-
GERS L. REV. 951,958-59 (1990); Mayer, supra note 67, at 323.
262 See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727,737 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); BAR-
NEAT, supra note 11, at 240-41.
269 See generally Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 188; Alito Confirmation Hearing,
supra note 188; supra notes 129-180 and accompanying text.
265 See, e.g., Anderson, 437 F.2d at 914-15 (stating a nonfundamental right to grow hair
the length of one's choosing); Cook, 311 F. Stipp. at 620 (holding that the purpose of the
Ninth Amendment was to guarantee to individuals those rights inherent to citizenship in
democracies that are not enumerated in the Bill of Rights); Adler, 311 A.2d at 642 (describ-
ing a Ninth Amendment right to be treated by the physician of one's choosing); BARNETT,
supra note 11, at 234-42 (outlining a fundamental natural rights theory of unenumerated
rights).
270 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-79; see also Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,174 (1803); Lash, supra note 12, at 371. Madison stated in
the House of Representatives that the Ninth Amendment guarded against the most plausi-
ble argument that he had heard for keeping out the Bill of Rights: that listing certain
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B. The Supplemented Test and the Ninth Amendment's Role
The Ninth Amendment is a structural concept. 271 Madison did not
develop this Amendment as a test in and of itself. 272 Rather, the Ninth
Amendment was designed as a catch-all clause to ensure the considera-
tion of those rights that are unlisted in the Constitution. 273 The Ninth
Amendment, and not substantive due process, provides the history and
purposes for protecting unenumerated rights. 274 The history and pur-
poses of the Bill of Rights, the reasons for specific enumerations therein,
and the Ninth Amendment's own history should be the guideposts that
judges look to when reviewing claims under the current Glucksberg un-
enumerated rights test. 275
1. The Supplemented Test
First, courts may still narrowly define the asserted liberty interest,
but should look to both the legal traditions and history about that
right and the traditions and history of unenumerated rights generally,
by way of the Ninth Amendment and its ratification history. 276 If the
court determines that the asserted right is fundamental or is not a
right at all with these additional guideposts, it should proceed under
rights would imply that rights left unenumerated were not protected and were insecure.
Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-79.
eAstmt, supra note 84, at 327-28; Mc.AFFEE icr M.., supra note 198, at 34-35; Lash,
supra note 12, at 393-94. But see Yoo, supra note 110, at 1010 (contending that, because
state constitutions had provisions similar to the Ninth Amendment, they must have under-
stood such provisions to declare rights protections directly).
272 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Lash, supra note 12, at 393—
94.
2" See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 178-79.
274 See MASSEY, supra note 11, at 15-16; see also MCAFFEE ET AL., supra note 198, at 238-
39 (criticizing the approach of those who employ substantive due process to protect un-
enumerated fundamental rights).
275 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-79 (describing his pur-
poses for drafting the Ninth Amendment); see also BARNET r, supra note 11, at 249 (discuss-
ing a particular right in the Bill of Rights and how it was apt for infringement without spe-
cific constitutional protection); RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 125-26 (discussing the reasons
Antifederalists sought a bill of rights); SToitv, supra note 78, at 693-96 (same); Federal
Farmer, Letter XVI, supra note 92, at 133-35.
"6 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-89, 491-92 (Goldberg, J., concurring); AMAR, supra
note 84, at 328 & 11.* (stating that the relevant question should be what the protection for
a certain right was in the absence, or before the existence, of the Bill of Rights); see also
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (urging caution in determining unenumerated rights because
there are limited guideposts for proper decision making); MAsscv, supra note 11, at 13;
Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 178-79.
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the general structure of the current Glucksberg test.277 If, however, the
court determines that the asserted interest is a valid right, but is not
fundamental, it should require the governinent to show that it has a
rational basis for infringing that right.278
Importantly, the initial burden would still be on the person as-
serting the right because the government would have the presump-
tion of constitutionality. 270 But if the person asserting the right can
counter this presumption with strong evidence that the legislature did
not have a sufficient rational basis for infringing the nonfundamental
right, the burden would shift to the state government to explain its
police power justification, or to the federal government to account for
its enumerated powers justification. 288
The courts that have used the Ninth Amendment as a protector of
rights have generally employed a test similar to that of substantive due
process—a reliance on the tradition and history of protections or pro-
hibitions of some asserted liberty interest. 281 The Ninth Amendment's
history, however, would help provide further guideposts. 282 Once a
right is determined and its proper level of importance is established--
rri See 521 U.S. at 719-22.
778 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (protecting a liberty interest by concluding that the
government had no rational basis for infringing the interest); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-
22 (requiring the government to show only some rational basis). The Court developed its
presumption of constitutionality doctrine in response to its earlier decisions protecting
economic rights too strongly. See Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4; see also Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-54, 57 (1905), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963), and Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 392 U.S. 421 (1952).
279 See Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 11.4; BARNETT, supra note 11, at 230-34 (describ-
ing the "Footnote Four-Plus" approach to the presumption of constitutionality).
28° See Goldberg, supra note 57, at 1240-41 (describing theory and importance of em-
pirical bases for legislation, including the morality context). Compare Powell v. State, 510
S.E.2d 18, 25 (Ga. 1998) (invalidating antisodomy law for going beyond the proper scope
of the police power), with Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d
804, 819-20 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that even if the assumptions underlying the gov-
ernment's belief in preventing homosexuals from adopting are wrong, the mere fact that
they can be argued is sufficient to pass rational basis review).
281 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Cook, 311 F. Stipp. at 619-20
(stating that the purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to guarantee to individuals those
rights inherent to citizenship in democracies that are not enumerated in the Bill of
Rights); In re Gtiardianship of Thompson, 32 I-law. 479, 485-86 (1932) (denying the inal-
ienable right of a father to the care and custody of his child based on states' history of
removing children from fathers in custody disputes, even without fault). Even natural
rights theorists, who argue that the unenurnerated rights of the Ninth Amendment are the
natural rights of the people and are fundamental, rely on the history of the founders' be-
liefs in and protection of natural rights. See BARNETr, supra note 11, at 54-60.
282 See Gris-roold, 381 U.S. at 488-89, 491-92 (Goldberg, J., concurring); AMAR, supra
note 84, at 328 & n.*.
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fundamental, nonfundamental, or simply nonexistent—then a more ac-
curate review of the right at stake and the ability of the government to
interfere with it can be made.288
The main rights question Madison and the other drafters of the
Constitution considered was whether the government could validly in-
fringe a particular right, not whether a fundamental right existed. 284
Instead of focusing entirely on the all-or-nothing question of whether a
fundamental right is being asserted, courts should look to whether the
government had a proper justification for making a law that infringes
on someone's nonfundamental right.285 After a person presents strong
evidence against legislation and shifts the burden to the government,
the legislation may still infringe upon this right with a showing of some
rational basis to invade that right. 286 It does slightly raise the burden on a
government to require it to show that it can validly infringe a right—
even if it is a nonfundamental one—rather than merely have some ra-
tional basis for passing a law. 287 But the presumption of constitutionality
for government action remains until the person asserting a right shows
that the government has an improper or no rational basis for infring-
ing that right. 288
2. Implementing the Supplemented Test for Unenumerated Rights:
An Example
A recent survey found that many American people thought there
was a right to have a pet somewhere in the Constitution. 289 This is a
"5 See Powell, 510 S.E.2t1 at 25. Compare Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-68 (describing a non-
fundamental liberty interest and determining whether the state has the ability to regulate
it), and Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 49-50 (determining the police power justifications for legisla-
tion), with Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819-20 (accepting a government's argument as rational, even
if its underlying assumptions are wrong).
"4 MORGAN, supra note 78, at 138-39; Lash, .supra note 12, at 374.
"5 See Raymond Ku, Swingers: Morality Legislation and the Limits of State Police Power, 12
Sr. THOMAS L. Ray. 1, 3 (1999) (discussing the differences between asking whether a per-
son has a right to do Xand whether the government has a right to regulate or prohibit X).
286 See Goldberg, supra note 57, at 1240-41 (describing theory and importance of em-
pirical bases for legislation, including the morality context); Ku, supra note 285, at 3.
257 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-67 (striking down legislation as having no rational ba-
sis for infringing a liberty interest); Ku, .supra note 285, at 3 (discussing whether a govern-
ment has the power to regulate a right to sexual autonomy). Contra Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819-
20 (requiring only a rational argument for passing legislation, even if the argument's un-
derlying assumptions are wrong).
"a See Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 11.4; BARNETT, supra note 11, at 230-34 (describ-
ing the "Footnote Four-Plus" approach to the presumption of constitutionality).
259 See Associated Press, Study: More Know 'Simpson' Than Constitution, Mar. 1, 2006,
lutp://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,186455,00.1itml.
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right that seems intuitive to the common citizen, and may be a non-
fundamental right that deserves at least some protection from the legal
system under this supplemented test.290 Assuming that the right to have
a pet—focusing more on the right to companionship than property—is
appropriately a nonfundamental right, it should not be fully denied
merely because it was not, in fact, enumerated in the Constitution. 291
Those involved in the debates leading up to the Bill of Rights knew they
could not list every single valid right. 292 A potential plaintiff theoreti-
cally could, then, present information regarding the ratification history
of the enumerated rights in the Constitution and the Ninth Amend-
ment to help establish that the right to have a pet is at least nonfunda-
men ta1. 293
Suppose person Y has a bird, a cat, and a horse as pets. In light of
the potential for the deadly bird flu to enter the United States, assume
the government of state X, in which person Y resides, passes a law that
no person may have any pets. 294 Under the current unenumerated
rights test, if person Y challenged this law under the liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Y will have a weak case in,
light of the many existing regulations over pet ownership. 295 The gov-
ernment of state X would merely have to show that it has a rational ba-
9° See id.; cf. Statement of Rep. Sedgwick, supra note 10, at 8 (stating that simple rights,
such as the rights to wear a hat or wake up when one pleases, were clearly not under the
control of the government in 1789 and did not need to be specifically listed in the Consti-
tution to be protected).
291 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 178-
79.
292 See Statement of Rep. Sedgwick, supra note 10, at 8-9; Iredell's Speech in the North
Carolina Convention, supra note 10, at 145-46.
295 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX; Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 178-
79; see also Statement of Rep. Sedgwick, supra note 10, at 8-9; lredell's Speech in the North
Carolina Convention, supra note 10, at 145-46.
294 See Carter Dougherty, Bird Flu Fears and New Rules Rattle German Pet Lovers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5,2006, at 13.
295 See Glurltsberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (enunciating the test as whether an asserted liberty
interest has been supported by tradition and history so as to be fundamental). There have
been a number of regulations about pets and other animals in states over the years—thus,
history and tradition appear to fall against the narrowly defined right to own a bird, own a
cat, or own a horse being fundamental. See, e.g, MICH. COMP. LAWS GENERAL INDEX 113-16
(2005) (listing the variety of animal disease-related laws in Michigan); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:5-2
(1998) (granting the N.J. State Board of Agriculture discretion to act in cases of contagious
or infectious diseases in animals as they determine); see also U.S. DEPT OF TREASURY, U.S.
CUSTOMS SERV., PETS AND WILDLIFE: LICENSING AND HEALTH REQUIREMENTS 1-2 (1999),
available at h up://www.cbp.gov/IinageCache/cgoviconten
 t./ publications/ pets_2epdf/v1/
pets.pdf (requiring screening procedures for re-entry of pets into the United States).
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sis for this law preventing pet ownership. 298 With the substantial hazards
of bird flu, this rational basis seems quite easily met for all three ani-
mals, regardless of what scientific evidence person Y could show about
the risks of transmission. 297
 The presumption of constitutionality would
further strengthen the government's argument that it had a rational
basis for enacting this extreme measure. 298
If, however, the presiding court first determines that person Yhas a
nonfundamental right to have these pets in the first place, at least the
court will go through a more thorough and complete analysis. Be-
cause the infringing legislation is a state law, the court will examine
whether the legislation was passed pursuant to the proper police power
to protect the health of its other citizens. 3" This would likely lead to
some scientific consideration of the risks of infection of these animals."'
If person Y presented strong evidence showing that although birds and
cats are susceptible to the bird flu more than humans, horses are no
more susceptible than humans, there would be a rational basis pre-
sumption for the law preventing Y from having cats and birds, but not
for the law about horses.302 Later updates or changes to this evidence
could affect the validity of the police power justification, but would not
change the actual structure of analysis. 303
296 See Glurksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
257 See id.; Dougherty, supra note 294; cf. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819-20 (holding that even
if the assumptions underlying the government's belief in preventing homosexuals from
adopting are wrong, the mere fact that they can be argued is sufficient to pass rational
basis review).
2°5 See Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; BARNFITT, supra note 11, at 232-34.
29° See Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 49-50 (requiring a showing that the state was acting accord-
ing to its proper police powers); Goldberg, supra note 57, at 1240-41.
30° See Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 49-50. See generally FREUND, supra note 53; TIEDEMAN, supra
note 53; Barnett, supra note 52.
5°1 Cf. People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2t1 936,941 (N.Y. 1980) (examining whether a state's
justifications for regulation are legitimate enough to invade a nonfundamental right).
5°2 Cf. id. (striking clown a law that did not fit the state's proper police powers); Bon-
adio, 415 A.2d at 49-50 (same).
"3 See supra notes 242-247 and accompanying text (describing how the overruling of
Bowers by Lawrence could have come about if the Court looked more closely at the evidence
for police power justifications). One might object to the proposed standard on efficiency
grounds, asking whether the government must provide evidence for every type of animal
before it enacts legislation, but this objection is mitigated by the legislation's presumption
of constitutionality. See Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4; BARNKfT, Supra note 11, at
232-33. The burden of persuasion remains on person Y to show that horses cannot trans-
mit bird flu any more easily than humans. See Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4; BAR-
NETT, supra note 11, at 232-33. Y's evidence showing this would carry much more weight,
though, if it was presented in light of some right; state governments have always been af-
forded a presumption of constitutionality, but only in the face of silence. See Carotene Prods.,
304 U.S. at 152 & n.4.
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V. COMBATING REASONS WHY COURTS AVOID THE NINTH AMENDMENT
After establishing a Ninth Amendment construction supplement-
ing substantive due process, there still appear to be three main reasons
why courts have avoided the Ninth Amendment since Griswold v. Con-
necticut.304 First, history shows that the Ninth Amendment was originally
meant to apply only against the federal government. 305 Second, judges
may not have the power to enforce unenumerated rights. 306 Third, the
Ninth Amendment seems tied to the emanations test set forth in Gris-
wold but since surpassed by substantive due process. 307
A. Application Against the States
The text of the Ninth Amendment says only certain things." It
says that the Ninth Amendment is meant to deal with the enumeration
problem regarding rights listed and those not listed in the Constitu-
tion." Rights that are unenumerated should not be denied or dispar-
aged merely because the Constitution does not explicitly list them.")
Lastly, the Ninth Amendment very much implies that there are other
rights retained by the people that are not listed in the Constitution. 3"
The Ninth Amendment does not mention the federal government;
in fact, a clause referring to the powers of the federal government was
specifically removed from the final draft 9 12 Although one purpose of the
Ninth Amendment was to limit federal powers, the method of this limita-
tion was to prevent the Bill of Rights from becoming an exhaustive list of
rights. 313 Most of the first eight amendments became applicable to state
governments by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment,
564 See infra notes 305-349 and accompanying text; see also McMITE Err AL, supra note
198, at 236 (describing the confusion in fundamental rights analysis over the past thirty-
five years).
"5 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 178-79; see also AMAR, supra
note 84, at 327; Lash, supra note 12, at 353.
506 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,91-92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mayer, su-
pra note 67, at 323; see also Bork Confirmation Hearings, supra note 184, at 441-42 app. B.
507 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-22 (1997); Roberts Confirmation
Hearing, supra note 188, at Day 1 (Sept. 12), Day 2, pt. VI (Sept. 13); Alito Confirmation
Hearing, supra note 188, at Day 2, pt. I ( Jan. 10), Day 3, pt. I ( Jan. 11).
5°8 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
509 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 178-
79; supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
910 See U.S, CONST. amend. IX.
511 See id.; Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 178-79; see also Barnett, su-
pra note 68, at 2.
512 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; Lash, supra note 12, at 349-50 n.78, 368-69.
515 See MassEv, supra note 11, at 67-68. 77; Lash, supra note 12, at 399-50 n.78, 368-69.
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and this Ninth Amendment structural conception of the Bill of Rights
and unenumerated rights should be no less applicable. 514
The Fourteenth Amendment's drafters did not expect the Ninth
Amendment to be directly incorporated. 315
 The question, however, is
whether the Ninth Amendment needs to be incorporated at all. 316 Al-
though the original purpose of the Ninth Amendment was partly to
limit the power of the federal government, the method selected was a
construction that focuses on how the Bill of Rights should be con-
strued and not specifically on limits to the federal power. 517
During the Constitutional Convention, delegates like Madison be-
lieved that rights and powers were so intertwined that protecting one
would limit the other. 318
 This interaction of rights and powers was an
important factor in the drafting of the Ninth Amendment. 319 It was also
a theory that generally applied to both states and the federal govern-
ment, although to varying degrees.320
 The federal government's powers
were only those enumerated in the Constitution; beyond them, the
rights of the people began."' The state governments enjoyed broad
police powers, but where they ended, the rights of the people also be-
gan.322
514 See MASSEY, supra note 11, at 166-61; PATTERSON, Supra note 68, at 23. One of the
results of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to "incorporate" a number of
the rights in the Bill of Rights, so as to apply these protections against state governments as
well as the federal government. See Rubin, supra note 26, at 835.
313
 Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment as Perceived by Randy Barnett, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. •
1508,1520 (1994).
sus
	 MASSEY, supra note 11, at 134-42,160-61. This is not to say definitively that the
Ninth Amendment was not inipliedly incorporated through ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment; rather, this is to say only that if it was not and never will be incorporated, it
may still apply against the states, though this would be a slightly weaker argument than
direct incorporation. See Barnett, supra note 68, at 15; see also Adamson v. California, 332
U.S, 46,70-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (claiming that the whole Bill of Rights—its tell
amendments—is applicable to states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
312 See MASSEY, supra note 11, at 67-69; Barnett, supra note 68, at 54.
SIB See MASSEY, supra note 11, at 67-68; Lash, supra note 12, at 374.
3'9
	 Massitv, supra note 11, at 67-68; Lash, supra note 12, at 374.
35° See PATTERSON, supra note 68, at 19-21.
321 See STORY, supra note 78, at 693-94; Lash, supra note 12, at 348.
522 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 180 (acknowledging the in-
definite abuses created by a state legislature of general powers); see also STORY, supra note
78, at 696. For the most part, rights were understood to exist before the creation of a gov-
ernment. See Wilson Statehouse Speech, supra note 51, at 121-22. Certain rights, however,
had to be given up by the people to form a government which, in turn, could act to pro-
tect their rights collectively. See PATTERSON, supra note 68, at 21 (quotation omitted);
RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 120. Other rights, however, may have been inalienable. Seejack-
son, supra note 62, at 506-07.
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B. Judicial Power to Enforce Unenumerated Rights
The Ninth Amendment was written to guard against the abuses of
unconstitutional legislation. 323 Madison was already wary of the abuses
then occurring in state governments of broad powers when he drafted
the Ninth Amendment.324 If judges have little or no power to protect
unenumerated rights, then Madison placed all the control into the
hands of the very legislators he meant to restrain.323 Instead, his state-
ments on the matter reveal a different plan. 326
Madison contended that the Ninth Amendment would help pro-
tect unenumerated rights, but not necessarily all unenumerated rights
with the same vigor as each enumerated right. 327 At the time, Madison
did not doubt that unenumerated rights likely would be protected by
judges less ardently than enumerated rights. 328 Thomas Jefferson actu-
ally tried to convince Madison that protecting some rights strongly and
others weakly was better than not protecting them at a11.829 These
statements all presume, however, that they desired unenumerated rights
to be actively protected at least in some way.")
Rights were not listed to elevate their status, but rather to ensure
that they were properly protected."' One of Madison's primary con-
cerns was not allowing democratic legislative majorities to pass whatever
laws they felt appropriate against disfavored minorities. 332 There would
be no better way to deny or disparage unenumerated rights than to say
that they are not worthy of judicial consideration. 333
Ultimately, the Ninth Amendment was developed to do the follow-
ing: (1) maintain as close as possible the structure and balance of pow-
ers that the drafters first envisioned, before the addition of the Bill of
Rights; (2) ensure that all rights would receive at least some protection
and not just those enumerated; (3) help protect every simple right that
325 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 172, 177-79; see also Lash, su-
pra note 12, at 353.
324 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-78.
'25 See id. at 178-79. It would seem to greatly disparage unenumerated rights if they are
not worthy of judicial consideration. MASSEY, supra note 11, at 13.
326 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-79.
327 See Id. at 179.
328 See 14.
329 See Letter from Jefferson to Madison, supra note 112, at 166.
35° See BARNErr, supra note 11, at 75-76,266-67.
331 Barnett, supra note 68, at 28-29.
332 Ste James S. Liebman & Brandon L. Garrett, Madisonian Equal Protection, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 837,843 (2004) (outlining in detail Madison's conception of equal protection for the
new Constitution).
533 MASSEY, supra note 11, at 13.
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could not possibly be enumerated; and (4) prevent expansive readings
of the valid federal powers by protecting enumerated and unenumer-
ated rights."4
 judicial power to enforce unenumerated rights is integral
to achieving each of these purposes. 335
C. Disuse of the Emanations Theory
The majority's reasoning in Griswold—that unenumerated rights
can be recognized as emanations of rights actually listed—is rarely fol-
lowed today in determining whether asserted liberty interests are fun-
damental rights."6
 The Ninth Amendment is not as intimately tied to
the majority's reasoning in Griswold as it appears and, thus, should not
be avoided merely because of this reasoning's disuse. 337 The majority's
reference to the Ninth Amendment was limited to stating its actual text,
with no explanatory analysis. 338
 At most, the Ninth Amendment was
used to show that some test to determine unenumerated rights is valid
and required. 339
The Ninth Amendment was considered more extensively in Justice
Goldberg's concurrence. 34° Justice Goldberg did not rely entirely on
the Ninth Amendment to recognize the right of privacy. 341 He used the
Ninth Amendment to support his argument that substantive due proc-
ess can be used to protect unenumerated fundamental rights. 342
 The
majority of his analysis of the Ninth Amendment was written to demon-
strate the importance of its history to the Constitution as a whole.so In
another concurrence, Justice Harlan stated that substantive due process
554 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-79; see also MASSEY, supra
note 11, at 69-70; Lash, supra note 12, at 353.
355
 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-79; see also MASSEY, supra
note 11, at 13.
339 See Glueltsberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (outlining the current unenumerated rights test);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,482-84 (1965). In 2005-2006, the two most recent
Supreme Court nominees stated that substantive due process analysis had surpassed the
emanations test from the majority in Griswold, and so this trend appears likely to continue.
See Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 188, at Day 2, pt. VI (Sept. 13); Alit° Confirma-
tion Hearing, supra note 188, at Day 3, pt. 1 (Jan. 11).
337 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
333 See id.
359 See id.
540 See id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
'41 See id.
542 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487,493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
343 See id. at 487-93.
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can rest on its own strength. 344 His opinion is basically what courts fol-
low today. 345
This current approach is flawed, however, because substantive due
process, which currently exists on its own without Ninth Amendment
support, no longer relies on the strong constitutional foundation that
Justice Harlan believed it did in Griswold."6 The past forty years have
seen unpredictable results and only a small number of affirmative pro-
tections of unenumerated rights, fundamental or otherwise. 347 Numer-
ous tests and theories have been set forth to analyze unenumerated
rights.348 Supplementing substantive due process with the Ninth
Amendment would provide significant support for the continuing valid-
ity of judges protecting unenumerated rights of all degrees 349
CONCLUSION
James Madison drafted the Ninth Amendment to ensure that un-
enumerated rights were protected in some way, and therefore the
Amendment's history should be used to help provide the guideposts for
unenumerated rights analysis. Courts today instead use substantive due
process alone, but it is incomplete because it focuses solely on funda-
mental unenumerated rights. This demands an all-or-nothing approach
towards rights and furthers the current trepidation about expanding
protection of rights. The ability of courts to recognize nonfundamental
rights would limit the harm of this approach.
First, courts still should narrowly define the asserted liberty interest,
but should look to both the legal traditions and history of that right and
the traditions and history of unenumerated rights generally through the
Ninth Amendment's ratification history. If the court determines that the
asserted right is fundamental or not a right at all, it should proceed un-
544 See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
m5 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-22; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
50 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-22; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring);
McArrEE ET AL., supra note 198, at 238-39.
S!7 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720; .supra notes 26-45,158-183 and accompanying text.
344 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-22 (outlining the current test); Griswold, 381 U.S. at
484-86 (outlining a penumbras and emanations test); AMAR, supra note 84, at 328-29
(suggesting that courts should look to the collective decisions of the people over time,
through state constitutions and lived traditions, for unenumerated rights); BARNETT, supra
note II, at 237-42 (outlining a fundamental natural rights theory for unenumerated
rights).
"9 See Madison's Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 10, at 177-79; see also Griswold, 381
U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring); BARNETT, supra note 11, at 234-42; Roosevelt, supra
note 23, at 1000-02. .
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der the current unenumerated rights test. If, however, the court deter-
mines that the asserted interest is a nonfundamental right and a person
presents strong evidence against the legislation, the court should re-
quire the government to show that it has a rational basis for infringing
that right.
After establishing a Ninth Amendment construction, there still
appear to be three main reasons why the Ninth Amendment has been
avoided: it originally applied only against the federal government,
judges may not have the power to enforce unenumerated rights, and
the Ninth Amendment seems tied to the emanations test which the ma-
jority in Griswold v. Connecticut used, but which now has been surpassed
by substantive due process. These concerns can be alleviated and, ac-
cordingly, the inherent problems of employing the Ninth Amendment
can subside.
The history and purposes of the Bill of Rights, the reasons for spe-
cific enumerations, and the Ninth Amendment should serve as guide-
posts for judges in examining unenumerated rights. Altering the cur-
rent unenumerated rights test with this support would reinforce all of
the rights retained by the people, fundamental and nonfundamental.
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